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Money Can’t Buy You Love
VALUING CONTRIBUTIONS BY NONRESIDENTIAL
FATHERS
Laurie S. Kohn†
INTRODUCTION
Family law in the United States reflects and reinforces
expectations about how fathers should interact with their
children. Those expectations betray the legal system’s valuation of
paternal financial contributions above other types of caretaking.
This differential valuation, though advantageous to the overall
well-being of some children, negatively affects low-income
families, exacerbates cultural and societal pressures that deter
men from being engaged parents, and compels mothers who seek
paternal engagement to parent alone. As the populations of
absent fathers and fathers who are unable to meet their child
support obligations grow, it is worth reevaluating the relative
value the legal system assigns to paternal financial contributions
and to caretaking. By recalibrating their relative worth so that
the legal system holds the value of both paternal roles in
equipoise, child support and paternal engagement could mutually
reinforce each other and together enhance opportunities for
fathers, mothers, and children.
The legal system expresses the clear message that the role
of a father is to provide for his children financially, and in
fulfilling or failing in that role, a father’s value to his children is
determined.1 By failing to support or assign credit for caring for
† Associate Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington University Law
School. I am grateful for the invaluable input of Naomi Cahn, Phyllis Goldfarb, Clare
Huntington, Catherine Ross, Naomi Schoenbaum, and Jane Stoever, and for the
feedback I received from the Feminist Collaborative Network at the Law and Society
Conference in Minneapolis and from the Clinical Law Review Writer’s Workshop. I was
so fortunate to have the research support of Caroline Bielak, Furqan Shukr, Evelina
Rene, and Catherine Bartz.
1 See generally Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the
Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (2013)
(discussing the barriers to father engagement and the law’s role in perpetuating those
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children in nonfinancial ways, the legal system denigrates the
value of caretaking. Financial support is, of course, critical to the
well-being of children and custodial parents—for the most part
mothers2—who are primarily responsible for those children. Yet
in valuing fathers only for their breadwinning capacities,
especially when those capacities are entirely or severely
circumscribed, children may be harmed, and mothers are thrust,
at times unwillingly, into their gender-prescribed role of sole
nurturer and caretaker.3
The relationship between fathers and the legal system has
garnered increased attention in recent years. Kathryn Edin and
Timothy J. Nelson’s 2013 book, Doing the Best I Can, chronicles
their study of low-income inner city fathers and their children.4
While the book explores the myriad social forces, narratives, and
pressures that result in fathers disappearing from the lives of
their children, one broadly applicable conclusion is that many of
these fathers feel a strong emotional pull to engage with their
children5 and at the same time feel underinspired to make
significant financial contributions to support their offspring.6 The
authors observe that fathers “recoil at the notion that they are
just a paycheck.”7 They further conclude that our legal structure
reinforces this conception, observing that “[a]t every turn an
unmarried man who seeks to be a father, not just a daddy, is
rebuffed by a system that pushes him aside with one hand while
reaching into his pocket with the other.”8
obstacles). This article builds on my recent scholarship focused on the barriers to paternal
engagement exacerbated and created by the legal system. Id. This article moves beyond
the descriptive thrust of the earlier article and considers the legal system’s historic
characterization of the value of noncustodial fathers and analyzes how that
characterization can disserve children, mothers, the state, and fathers themselves.
2 The vast majority of custodial parents to whom child support is owed are
women. TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS
AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2011, at 7 (2013).
3 Feminist scholars have argued for the disruption of gender norms to move
toward increased sexual equality. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 272 (1999) (arguing that involving men in caretaking will allow them to develop
capacities necessary for a democratic society); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER,
AND THE FAMILY 175-76 (1989) (arguing that public policy should support equal shared
parenting to allow women to reach their potential); Sara Ruddick, Thinking About
Fathers, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 222, 230 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds.,
1990) (stating that conceiving of fathers as the sole source of financial support distorts
society’s understanding of mothers).
4 KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN:
FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY (2013).
5 Id. at 18.
6 Id. at 119.
7 Id. at 18.
8 Id. at 216.
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On an episode of Oprah, the talk show host took on the
issue of absent fathers and the perennial question posed by their
children: “Why did he leave?” One expert explained, “I have
found [that] the kryptonite for men is inadequacy.”9 The talk
show guests agreed that for low-income fathers, the paternal
role is riddled with opportunities to feel inadequate.10 An expert
from the National Fatherhood Initiative ultimately traced the
causes of paternal perceptions of inadequacy back to the
government, explaining:
We almost talk about fathers . . . solely as providers. If you look at the
way the government [sort of] treats fathers[,] we have the child support
system for dads who aren’t married to mom . . . . There aren’t programs
that really focus on the other aspects [of fathering,] which [are]
nurturing, connecting heart to heart with your kids, the emotional well
being of your kids, and guiding, which is instilling values . . . .11
The effects of the legal system’s emphasis on paternal
breadwinning are nowhere more evident than among the cohort
of low-income parents who are in court to address custody,
parenting time, and child support. In family court and through
the operation of child support laws, a father’s caretaking is
treated as discretionary; however, his financial obligations—
which may be impossible to meet—are aggressively imposed and
enforced without nuance.
In the end, the perspectives reflected in the comments by
the fathers in Edin and Nelson’s study and in the opinions of
Oprah’s guests are worth considering because they profoundly
affect the behavior of low-income fathers and the lives of children
and their mothers. This article asserts that a recalibration of how
to ascribe value to paternal roles has the potential to not only
provide different incentives for fathers, but to convey a greater
sense of hopefulness for them. This shift would also support
mothers in their efforts to care for and support their children,
maximizing the potential for parents to provide holistically for
their children.
In Part I, this article examines the roots of the
disproportionate values the legal system assigns to paternal roles
9 Absent Fathers: An Absentee Dad Explains Why Men Leave Their Children
(VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2013, 9:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/05/08/absent-fathers-dad-why-men-leave-children_n_3231932.html [http://perma.cc/
M9T7-KZVV].
10 Id. (quoting an absent father explaining that he left his children because he
was unable to be the father that he wanted to be, and quoting an expert who explained that
such feelings of imperfection stem from amisunderstanding about the role of fathers).
11 Oprah’s Lifeclass: The Secret Pain of Single Mothers (OWN television
broadcast May 12, 2013).
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in the family law and child support system, looking to social
norms, traditional family law, and the state’s interests in the
well-being of children. In Part II, this article analyzes how this
hierarchy of values reveals itself in the current structure of child
support laws and in the enforcement of parenting-time orders on
the one hand and child support obligations on the other. In Part
III, the article considers the effect of disproportionate values on
low-income fathers, mothers, children, and the state.
Finally, in Part IV, this article envisions ways in which
the family law system could implement changes that would
inevitably reapportion value to these two paternal roles, recasting
both child support and caretaking, when appropriate, as mutually
important to children. This Part explores changes to child support
law and alternative approaches to the enforcement of custody,
parenting time, and child support orders that would assist in
equalizing the legal system’s interest in the two paternal roles and
ultimately, in stabilizing families. While equalizing the valuation of
paternal roles could have a salutary effect on all families, this
article focuses on changes to the system that would address the
particular situation of low-income, noncustodial parents, since
those parents are the least able, even in the face of coercion, to
fulfill their breadwinner roles.12 In considering such initiatives,
the article analyzes the collateral consequences of these changes
and the possible benefits and detriments to mothers.
The dramatic rise of single parent families13 headed by
women also suggests that our legal system needs to reconsider
how to make more robust and relevant the role of the
noncustodial parent. Such a shift in perspective could allow the
breadwinner and caretaker roles to mutually reinforce one
another, reduce barriers to low-income paternal engagement,
liberate mothers from their sole caretaking role when desirable
and positive for children, influence social norms that exacerbate
father absence, and allow the state to better meet its goals of
supporting children’s well-being without excessive state
12 Poor fathers constitute 25% of the total population of nonresidential
fathers, which is a significant minority of the nonresidential population. Elaine
Sorensen & Chava Zibman, Poor Dads Who Don’t Pay Child Support: Deadbeats or
Disadvantaged?, URB. INST., Apr. 2001. For every poor father who doesn’t pay child
support, there are nearly two nonpoor fathers. Id. Therefore, it stands to reason that
policies tend to be developed to address the nonpoor father community.
13 See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 29 (2014) (setting forth statistics that show increasing trends
in single parent households, particularly in the low-income community, and ultimately
illustrating that 27% of children in the United States currently live in single-parent
homes compared with the 10% of children who did so in 1965).
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expenditure. The article concludes that the legal system, as well
as low-income mothers, fathers, and children, all stand to reap
significant benefits from recalibrating these paternal values and
adopting higher expectations for the noncustodial parent.14
I. THE ROOTS OF THE PATERNAL ROLE’SHIERARCHY IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM
The legal system’s current valuation of the paternal
breadwinning role as preeminent to any other parental function—
particularly a father’s role as caregiver—has deep roots in social
norms, traditional family law doctrine, and practical concerns
about child well-being and the role of the state. Though
contemporary family law is formally gender neutral,15 these
origins highly influence both the application of the law and the
operation of the court system.
A. Social Norms
Despite some destabilization in the traditional gender
assignment of household and childcare work, historic social norms
provide the roots of the hierarchy of paternal values, and
contemporary social norms perpetuate the hierarchy. Traditional
familial gender roles cast men as breadwinners and women as
nurturers.16 Both the paternal breadwinning role and the
14 This article analyzes and proposes transitions in the legal system as a way
to support children and create healthier non-intact, low-income families. Other
scholars have suggested that adapting our current legal system may not be the most
effective way to respond to family conflict, especially given the changing nature of the
family and relationships. They argue for more transformative changes. See, e.g., NANCY
E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 164 (1997) (arguing for a
“reorientation of the state’s relationship to families,” especially regarding the “concepts
of equality and children’s rights”); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167 (2015) (arguing that the
radical changes in family structure require new theories of state regulation, doctrines,
institutions, and norms or practice and suggesting nonlegal responses).
15 See, e.g., Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18
MICH. J. GENDER& L. 229, 230 (2012) (“Even while the law of parenting is formally sex-
neutral, the culture and actual practices of parenting are anything but.”).
16 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Is Marriage for Rich Men?, 13 NEV. L.J.
386, 397 (2013) (stating that “[t]he male-breadwinner role continues to define male
success, and the loss of both status and income that comes with lesser employment causes
many men who cannot meet the expectations associated with the breadwinner role” to be
considered failures); Andrea Doucet, Gender Roles and Fathering, in HANDBOOK OF
FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 297-99 (Natasha J. Cabrera &
Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda eds., 2d ed. 2013) (providing an overview of the history of
the father-as-breadwinner and mother-as-caregiver dichotomy over the last century);
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1892 (2000) (“[W]omen are first and
foremost committed to domesticity—as wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, general
nurturers, and providers of care and cleanup.”).
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maternal nurturing role date far back in our nation’s history,17
and social norms enforce and perpetuate these roles to this day,
even in the face of modern family law.18
While men are taking on an increasing amount of
domestic work,19 homemaking and caretaking have remained
predominantly female activities. Data compiled by the American
Time Use Survey illustrate that men still lag far behind women in
contributing to the household and to childcare.20 Overall, based on
a 2010 study, mothers living in homes with children under the
age of 18 devoted an average of 31 hours per week to housework
and childcare combined, whereas fathers in those households
spent only 17 hours per week on the same activities.21
If one looks specifically at childcare, mothers and fathers
continue to dedicate disproportionate amounts of time to this
parental role. While according to a 2010 study, the time men
devoted to childcare was marginally more substantial than that
reported in a similar study in 2003,22 and certainly more
17 See Michael Lamb, How Do Fathers Influence Children’s Development? Let
Me Count the Ways, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (Michael
Lamb ed., 5th ed. 2010) (tying the breadwinning role back to the Industrial Revolution
and asserting the continuing pervasiveness of that role).
18 Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86
VA. L. REV., 1901, 1915 (2000); see PAUL RAEBURN, DO FATHERS MATTER?: WHAT
SCIENCE IS TELLING US ABOUT THE PARENT WE’VE OVERLOOKED 217 (2014) (discussing
contemporary studies and concluding “[t]he stereotypes remain; the first thing fathers
have to do is to prove they can support the family financially”).
19 JO JONES &WILLIAM D. MOSHER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
FATHERS’ INVOLVEMENT WITH THEIR CHILDREN: UNITED STATES, 2006-2010, at 1 (2013);
Gretchen Livingston & Kim Parker, A Tale of Two Fathers: More Are Active but More Are
Absent, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (June 15, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/06/
15/a-tale-of-two-fathers/ [http://perma.cc/MEZ5-5M73].
20 See Naomi R. Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177,
182 n.21 (2000) (citing various studies of gender differentiation in childcare illustrating that
women perform more childcare than men); Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture and Family: The
Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 785, 791
(2003) [hereinafter Dowd, Law, Culture and Family] (“[T]he pattern of custody and care of
children remains sharply skewed by gender.” (footnote omitted)); Charity M. Brown,Women
Are More Likely Than Men to Give Up Sleep to Care for Children and Others, WASH. POST
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR
2011021405833.html [http://perma.cc/L7M3-4U8D] (describing a 2011 study finding that
women are more likely than men to care for their children at night); see also Cahn, supra
note 20, at 188-92 (discussing women’s circumscribed choices about whether or not to take
on a disproportionate share of caretaking tasks in the family).
21 Wendy Wang, Parents’ Time with Kids More Rewarding than Paid Work—and
More Exhausting, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2
013/10/08/parents-time-with-kids-more-rewarding-than-paid-work-and-more-exhausting/
[http://perma.cc/RZ5F-YLAD] (interpreting the American Time Use Survey of 2010).
22 Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY 2003
tbl.7 (2004) (reporting that men over 18 living in a household with children under 18
spent an average of .81 hours per day performing childcare activities), with BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY 2012 tbl.9 (2013) (reporting that men
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substantial than in 1965,23 men are still devoting significantly
less time per day to childcare than women. According to the
survey, fathers engaged in a mere 55% of the childcare that
women undertook.24
Even the recent recession and increased unemployment
have failed to equalize the time investment men and women
make in childcare. In 2012, unemployed men living in a
household with children under the age of six reported spending an
average of 1.82 hours per day caring for children.25 During the
same period, similarly situated unemployed women reported
devoting an average of 2.82 hours per day to childcare.26 But these
statistics assess caretaking in homes with residential fathers.
Fathers who live apart from their children devote far less time to
caretaking than residential fathers.27
While the stigma associated with men performing
childcare tasks has certainly lessened in the last several decades,
its salience endures in our culture, both revealing and perpetuating
gendered parenting norms.28 For example, in 2011, the New York
over 18 living in a household with children under 18 spent an average of .91 hours per
day performing childcare activities).
23 Liana C. Sayer et al., Are Parents Investing Less in Children? Trends in
Mothers’ and Fathers’ Time with Children, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1, 21, tbl.2 (2004)
(illustrating that men spent an average of 17 minutes per day on childcare in 1965).
24 In households in which the youngest child was under six, in 2008-2012, for
example, men devoted an average of 1.37 hours per day to childcare as a primary
activity. Similarly situated women, by contrast, spent an average of 2.47 hours per day
on childcare as a primary activity. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME
USE SURVEY 2012 tbl.9 (2013).
25 Id. at tbl. 8. It is also interesting to note that despite statistics that show a
growing number of at-home, primary caregiver fathers, one commentator studying
news accounts of at-home fathers asserts that a larger proportion of those fathers were
caring for children because they had lost their job rather than because they
affirmatively wanted to care for their offspring. See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, Dirty
Harry Meets Dirty Diapers: Masculinities, At-Home Fathers, and Making the Law Work
for Families, 22 TEX. J. WOMEN& L. 1, 16-17 (2012).
26 AMERICAN TIMEUSE SURVEY 2012, supra note 22, at tbl.8.
27 Livingston & Parker, supra note 19, at 3 (“When it comes to spending time
with a child, being in the same home makes a huge difference.”). Only 10% of
nonresidential fathers reported helping their children with homework several times a
week or more, and only 11% transport their children to activities. Id. at 5.
28 Even contemporary studies assessing the public’s value of fathers, which
illustrate that fathers are now appreciated for more than just breadwinning, reveal
that the public continues to see financial support to be predominantly a male
responsibility and emotional support a mother’s responsibility. For example, a recent
study conducted by the Pew Research Center illustrated that fathers are not valued
by the public as providers of emotional support. The New American Father,
PEWRESEARCHCENTER (June 14, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06/14/the-
new-american-father/ [http://perma.cc/5M5M-4LWC]. Yet multiple studies have shown
that even for fathers who are primary caregivers and no longer work full time outside of
the home, they “still feel judged as primary breadwinners.” Doucet, supra note 16, at 306
(citing multiple studies as support); see also Burkstrand-Reid, supra note 25, at 22. One
at-home father stated: “If I’m a man and I’m not earning a living, I’m not being productive
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Times ran a front-page article entitled: “Fatherhood Cuts
Testosterone, Study Finds, for the Good of the Family.” The
article reported on a study in which fathers who cared for their
children were found to have a more significant decrease in their
testosterone level than their childless peers.29 Though the article
touted the testosterone change as a welcome and biologically
understandable phenomenon, the study also reinforced men’s
concerns about the “unmanly”30 nature of childcare.31 Recent media
coverage of at-home fathers who are motivated by caretaking
discussed the father accepting “female” tasks and referred
repeatedly to fathers who perform such tasks as “Mr. Mom.”32
A recent Pew Center study further revealed that the
public still characterizes caretaking as a predominantly maternal
role despite an increased number of fathers staying home to care
for children. In a 2013 study, the Pew Center reported that only
8% of respondents in a large-scale study felt that children are
better off if a father stays home rather than works outside the
home.33 By contrast, 51% of survey respondents believed that
children are better off if their mother doesn’t work outside the
home.34 Significantly, despite the data showing that fathers are
currently more engaged with their children than in the past, the
public doesn’t necessarily recognize that shift. A Pew Center
study reported that today, the public is “evenly split” over the
question of fathers’ relative involvement with their children as
compared to 20 or 30 years ago, noting that 46% of those surveyed
stated that fathers play a greater role now, and 45% reported that
they play less of a role.35 Commentators have argued that
traditional notions of masculinity, which have cast the father as
in a traditional way, I may feel that people look down on me. Other men may look at what
I’m doing. You’re a stay-at-home what? And that’s hard.” Id.
29 Pam Belluck, Fatherhood Cuts Testosterone, Study Finds, for the Good of
the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A1.
30 Dave Golokhov, Fatherhood and Testosterone, Scientific Fact: Kids Make
You Less Manly, ASKMEN, http://www.askmen.com/sports/health/515_fatherhood-and-
testosterone.html [perma.cc/C37G-27VG] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
31 See Nancy E. Dowd, Sperm, Testosterone, Masculinities and Fatherhood, 13
NEV. L.J. 438, 449-51 (2013) (discussing the news coverage of at-home fathers, the
threat to traditional macho notions of masculinity, and the underlying current of
reporters’ efforts to reassure men that “this data was not necessarily bad news”).
32 Burkstrand-Reid, supra note 25, at 18.
33 Gretchen Livingston, Growing Number of Dads Home with the Kids:
Biggest Increase Among Those Caring for Family, PEWREASEARCHCENTER (June 5,
2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/06/05/growing-number-of-dads-home-with-
the-kids/ [http://perma.cc/WZ3M-ASZQ].
34 Id.
35 Livingston & Parker, supra note 19, at 7.
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the financial provider,36 have been partially responsible for the
sluggishness of the transformation of parenting gender norms.37
While paternal breadwinning and maternal caretaking can no
longer be accurately described as the exclusive roles of fathers
and mothers, these norms influence and describe the
predominant model of role distribution in the modern family.38
Because social norms fail to demand nurturing from a
father, his failure to provide it is not attended by social
reprobation.39 By contrast, society has long expressed its
disapproval of a father who fails to financially support his
children. The social narrative of the “deadbeat dad” who fails to
contribute financially is familiar in media and public awareness
campaigns alike.40 That deadbeat dad is condemned not for his
36 See Caryn E. Medved, Fathering, Caregiving, Masculinity: Stay-at-Home
Fathers and Family Communication, in WIDENING THE FAMILY CIRCLE 115, 119 (Kory
Floyd & Mark T. Morman eds., 2014) (“Primary family breadwinning has remained an
obligatory, pervasive, critical element of hegemonic definitions of masculinity and fathering
in the United States since the industrial revolution; breadwinning has been emblematic of
men’s power in marital relations and parenting.” (internal citation omitted)).
37 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 31, at 441-42 (analyzing the salience of
masculinities theory and fatherhood, arguing that a shift toward a norm of fathers as
caregivers has been slow, and advocating ways to change the norms by changing our
expectations and vision of fatherhood). Scholars have called for new notions of
masculinity to include nurturing and supportive parenthood. See id. at 441 (calling for
changes to policies and laws to dismantle cultural barriers and support a new norm of
father nurture and egalitarian parenting); see also Louise B. Silverstein, Fathering is a
Feminist Issue, 20 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 3, 30-31 (1996) (discussing new conceptions
of fatherhood). See generally Carbone, supra note 16, at 388 (noting that masculinities
theory has “taken on the construction of gender within marriage, centering in large
part on the assumptions about, and reinforcement of the male role as breadwinner”).
38 Professor Clare Huntington, in noting the enduring power of the
breadwinner/caretaking dichotomy, points out that “we are in a period of flux, with the
old model of breadwinning no longer applicable but no new model yet readily
available.” Huntington, supra note 14, at 233.
39 See Jessica L. Roberts, Conclusions from the Body: Coerced Fatherhood
and Caregiving as Child Support, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 501, 509 (2005) (“Because
being a father is almost exclusively associated with being an economic provider, a
father’s disengaging from his children does not violate social norms of fathering.”).
40 See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child
Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 353-54 (2005)
(describing the “Deadbeat Dad” stereotype as “well entrenched in American culture”); see
also Julie Bosman, Obama Sharply Assails Absent Black Fathers, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/16/us/politics/15cnd-obama.html [http://perma.cc/
9DHA-VRGV] (describing then-Senator Obama’s speech encouraging fathers to take an
active role in child rearing); Priyanka Tilve, Ex-Yankee Danny Tartabull Top LA Deadbeat
Dad, ABC NEWS (July 10, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/ex-yankee-
danny-tartabull-top-la-deadbeat-dad/ [http://perma.cc/WD8H-A9GB] (“Former Major
League Baseball star Danny Tartabull is the ‘Most Wanted’ deadbeat dad in Los Angeles
after failing to pay more than $275,000 in child support for his two sons . . . .”); ANVIL,
DEADBEAT DAD (Hypnotic Records 1998) (metal song about deadbeat dads, lyrics include:
“Deadbeat dad, support he won’t pay/ Deadbeat dad always staying away/ Deadbeat dad in
disgrace and despair/ Deadbeat dad to the kids it is not fair”); The Simpsons: Marge vs.
Singles, Seniors, Childless Couples and Teens, and Gays (FOX television broadcast Jan. 4,
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failure to care for his children, but for his failure to comply with
his paternal duty to provide financial support.41 Yet society is
outraged when a mother turns her back on a child.42 The outrage
has many origins, but it at least partially stems from the
expectations of maternal behavior developed by and encompassed
in our social norms. Social norms inform private and legal
decisionmaking and cement expectations about gender roles—
with men solidly cast as providers and women as nurturers.
B. Traditional Family Law Doctrine
The origins of the different values assigned to paternal
roles can be seen clearly in traditional custody and child support
doctrine, both of which embody and reinforce the caretaking and
wage-earning dichotomy in family gender roles. Family law’s
traditional doctrine influences the contemporary application of
custody law and informs the structure and enforcement of child
support law.
2004). In this episode, a local interest group builds a statue of a “deadbeat dad” reaching
into his pockets, complete with inscription reading “I Just Don’t Have It.” Id.
41 See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced
Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 940 (2005) (“Even if he has little contact with his
children, so long as he supports them financially he will not elicit the moral opprobrium
of most of his neighbors, coworkers, or relatives. . . . [S]ociety condemns economic deadbeat
dads but apparently cares little about emotional deadbeats.”); see, e.g., Deadbeat Parents:
14 Celebs Who Reportedly Had Trouble Making Child Support Payments, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 21, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/deadbeat-
parents-celebrit_n_2586035.html [http://perma.cc/8F6V-NK8F] (characterizing celebrity
fathers as “deadbeats” because of their failure to provide financial support for their
children); The Simpsons: A Milhouse Divided (FOX television broadcast Dec. 1, 1996). Kirk
Van Houten, Milhouse’s father, is a stereotypical and self-described “deadbeat dad” who is
mocked for his inability to provide for his son, despite his involvement in his life. See id.
42 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 523
(1996) (suggesting that maternal abandonment of children would be viewed with
“widespread alarm”); Andrea Doucet, Between Two F-Words: Fathering and Feminism,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-doucet/
feminism-fathering_b_840421.html [http://perma.cc/FG3M-G75F] (describing society’s
vastly different expectations for mothers and fathers and noting the “media frenzy” about
a mother who left her children and then returned); see also Carol Sanger, Separating
From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 386-87, 450 (1996) (discussing society’s view that
“most mothers who separate from children are selfish and ill-motivated”); Peggy Drexler,
Why There Are More Walk-Away Moms, CNN (May 6, 2013, 5:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/05/04/opinion/drexler-mothers-leaving [http://perma.cc/WJ5Y-THLJ] (“Mothers who
abandon their children tend to be judged far more harshly by society, and by their
children, than fathers who do the same . . . . When mothers abandon their children, it’s
seen as unnatural.”); Lea Goldman, What Kind of Mother Leaves Her Kids?, MARIE
CLAIRE (July 7, 2009), http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/mothers-giving-up-
custody [http://perma.cc/8P6G-42SS] (discussing how mothers who give up custody are
judged more harshly than fathers); Christine Spines, Love Them and Leave Them, ELLE
(May 21, 2013), http://www.elle.com/life-love/society-career/women-who-leave-their-
marriages-families [http://perma.cc/XX9W-AQX7] (discussing maternal abandonment as
“one of society’s biggest taboos”).
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1. Child Support Law
The history of child support law and enforcement also
reflects a deep-rooted focus on fathers as the primary source of
financial support. William Blackstone, in his eighteenth-century
Commentaries, noted that marriage is built on the “natural
obligation of the father to provide for his children.”43 Early
Colonial law provided that the state could sue only fathers for
support of their children.44 In the late 1700s, states implemented
“Bastardy Acts,” which permitted states to require parents to
cooperate in supporting illegitimate children.45 Though these Acts
targeted both parents, for the most part, women were merely
required to comply by identifying the father, whereas the father
was mandated to provide support for his illegitimate child.46 This
differential treatment may well have derived from the reality that
illegitimate children were more likely to live with their mothers
than their fathers. Regardless of the rationale, in the Bastardy
Acts, the government codified its expectation that fathers must
support their children financially but not in any other way. Later
statutes enacted nationwide remained focused on the husband as
the source of support to the exclusion of the mother.47
Indeed, early court dicta reinforced the primacy of a
father’s duty to support his children, with one case affirming a
43 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN
FOUR BOOKS 447 (George Sharswood ed., 1893).
44 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by
Rethinking Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y& L. 775, 778 (2012).
45 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM LITTELL, THE STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY; WITH
NOTES PRAELECTIONS, AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PUBLIC ACTS 282-83 (1809) (codifying
that fathers of illegitimate children are responsible for their maintenance); AN ACT FOR
THE MAINTENANCE OF BASTARD CHILDREN, 1795 N.J. Laws 152 (specifying that mother
and reputed father are responsible for maintenance of bastard children). See generally
Baker v. State, 26 N.W. 167, 169 (1885) (citing a state bastardy law specifying that it is
the natural obligation of the parent to support his offspring); Hatcher, supra note 44, at
778 (citing a 1781 Maryland law).
46 See, e.g., LITTELL, supra note 45, at 283 (requiring the mother to name
under oath the person who is the father of the illegitimate child and requiring the
father to provide for the child’s maintenance); Stafford v. Withers, 20 Ky. 510, 511
(1827) (holding that the state’s bastardy law was intended to force a father to support
his offspring); Schooler v. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. 88, 88 (1 Litt. Sel. Cas. 1809) (noting
that the state’s bastardy law is intended to enforce a natural duty against the father
for the benefit of the mother). See generally Hatcher, supra note 44, at 778.
47 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 139 (1933) (imposing an obligation only on the
father to maintain the children after divorce); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-206 (1870) (noting
that in a suit for custody, a father might be liable for support of a child); 1897 Haw.
Sess. Laws 702 (specifying that the father is liable for suitable and proper support of
his children in all respects); COMPILED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA 3192 § 27 (1881)
(providing only for the obligation of a father and not a mother to provide monetary
support to a spouse and children).
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mother’s right to seek support from a father, noting the “natural
obligation . . . on the father to bear the expense of the support and
education of his children.”48 Another case noted the “high moral
duty” of the father to support his children.49 One Illinois case
highlighted that this duty rested disproportionately on the father:
“The duty devolves first upon the father, and next upon the
mother . . . .”50 While contemporary child support law imposes on
both parents a duty to support their children, this historical focus
on men’s natural obligation to provide financial support feeds into
the current primacy of paternal financial support at the expense
of devaluing fathers’ nonfinancial parenting roles.
2. Custody Law
After a century of paternal preference in custody law,51
family law began to favor mothers in custody disputes during the
nineteenth century with the establishment of the maternal
preference,52 which endured well into the twentieth century.53
48 Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 634, 635-36 (Iowa 1917); see alsoWhite v. White, 180
S.W. 1004, 1005 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1915) (noting a father’s primary obligation to
support his minor children); Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 15 N.E. 471, 476 (Ohio 1887)
(affirming the natural duty of a father to support his children even if he is deprived of
custody of them); Evans v. Evans, 140 S.W. 745, 746 (Tenn. 1911) (holding that a
father’s natural duty of support is not extinguished by losing custody to the mother and
noting that this obligation is one imposed by natural law and the laws of society); Zilley
v. Dunwiddie, 74 N.W. 126, 127 (Wis. 1898) (“At the common law the husband was
primarily liable for the support of his minor children.”).
49 Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668, 673 (1885).
50 Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290, 291 (1868); see also Zilley, 74 N.W. at 127 (citing
a Wisconsin statute that made the father primarily liable for the support of his children).
51 Prior to the nineteenth century, and following British rule, U.S. law enforced a
paternal preference in custody disputes. See Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of
Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1123, 1126 (1999); David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial
Parents, 34 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 1461, 1467-68 (2006) (noting that a paternal preference
prevailed in the United States into the nineteenth century); see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Briggs, 16 Mass. 203, 205 (1 Pick. 1834) (stating in an early twentieth-century case that the
father “is by law clearly entitled to the custody of [the] child”).
52 See generally JILL ELAINEHASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 136-37 (2014)
(discussing the transition in nineteenth-century law from conceiving of children as
economic resources benefitting fathers to conceiving of them as “sources of economic
expense requiring a tremendous amount of caretaking, especially from mothers”);
Meyer, supra note 51, at 1468.
53 See, e.g., Meinhardt v. Meinhardt, 261 Minn. 272, 276 (1961) (holding, as
late as 1961, that “there is no substitute for the love, companionship, and guidance of a
good mother . . . . She has the time and opportunity of providing care and comfort to
children at times when normally the father is away from home. In many other ways
she is the one to whom the children normally look for guidance”). It’s important to note
that some state gender-bias reports, however, found bias against women and in favor of
men in custody proceedings in the late twentieth century. See, e.g., GENDER BIAS
STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 62 (1989) (reporting that when fathers sought
custody in contested cases, mothers were awarded sole custody in only seven percent of
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This preference relied on the natural law assumption that
mothers possess a biological mandate to care for and nurture
children.54 In contrast, courts characterized fathers, by nature, as
unequipped to care for children and at times even as detrimental
to their children’s well-being.55 The clearest example of the
maternal preference is embodied in the tender years doctrine,
which endured in the American legal system until the 1970s.56
The tender years doctrine—often applied as a presumption—
directed the judge to place a young child with her mother in a
custody dispute.57 This reinforced the notion that mothers were
uniquely qualified to care for young children.58
For many years, states assessed custody cases involving
older children using a primary-caregiver standard.59 This
those cases). But see Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One
Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian—An Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711,
717 (1989) (reporting on a study of 38 states and D.C. that found that fathers were only
awarded sole custody in 29% of contested cases).
54 See, e.g., Ex parte Alderman, 73 S.E. 126, 128 (N.C. 1911) (“The love of the
mother for her child, regardless of conditions and environments, has been proven by
the history of the ages . . . .”); Bruce v. Bruce, 285 P. 30, 37 (Okla. 1930) (“Courts know
that mother love is a dominant trait in the heart of a mother, even in the weakest of
women. It is of divine origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds and surpasses the
parental affection of the father. Every just man recognizes the fact that minor children
need the constant bestowal of the mother’s care and love.”); Freeland v. Freeland, 159
P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916) (“Mother love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of
women, and as a general thing, surpasses the paternal affection for the common
offspring, and moreover, a child needs a mother’s care even more than a father’s.”).
55 See, e.g., Alderman, 73 S.E. at 128 (“[I]t is sad to say that sometimes the
tie between father and child is a different matter, and requires the strong arm of the
law to regulate it with some degree of humanity and tenderness for the child’s good.”).
56 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (holding that
maternal and paternal roles were not necessarily to be considered differently); Watts v.
Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding the tender years presumption
unconstitutional under the state constitution). See generally Julie E. Artis, Judging the
Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 769, 770 (2004) (discussing the history of the tender years doctrine).
57 See Artis, supra note 56, at 770; see also CAL CIV. CODE § 138 (1935) (“As
between parents adversely claiming the custody, neither parent is entitled to it as of
right; but other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it should be given to
the mother; if it is of an age to require education and preparation for labor and
business, then to the father.”); Butler v. Butler, 134 So. 129, 130 (Ala. 1931) (holding
four-year-olds should be placed with their mothers); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 234 P.2d 103,
105-07 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (affirming that a three-year-old should be placed with
his mother under the tender years presumption).
58 See, e.g., Artis, supra note 56, at 770; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 119 N.W. 599, 600
(Iowa 1909) (“Nature has devolved upon the mother the care and nurture of her children in
tender years.”); St. Clair v. St. Clair, 507 P.2d 206, 216 (Kan. 1973) (“[I]f children are of
tender age they almost of necessity must be entrusted to their mother’s care . . . .”).
59 See Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child:
Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 433-39 (1990)
(citing cases that found that courts in at least 16 states gave some consideration to the
primary caretaker standard, with at least 7 of these states finding that the factor
should be given significant weight).
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standard also embodied the presumption that after family
dissolution, mothers should continue to care for children and men
should take a secondary role. In assessing who was the primary
caregiver, the court looked to which parent provided the bulk of
the caretaking prior to the custody dispute and awarded custody
to that parent.60 Naturally, since women were more likely to have
been consistently engaged in the lives of their children61 due to a
dearth of professional opportunities in the workforce and
traditional norms of nurturing, this standard favored mothers
and perpetuated the inequality in allocating responsibility for
nurturing and caretaking.62 Though child custody law is now
formally gender neutral, these deep-seated beliefs about gender-
specific parenting roles that animated traditional legal doctrine
influence the application of contemporary family law, where we
still see the application of the tender years principles and
decisions that deride parents for failing to fulfill their gendered
parenting roles.63
60 See generally Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child
Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168 (1984) (discussing the
parameters of the primary caretaker rule); Kathryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial
Decision-Making Regarding Custody of Minor Children: Looking at the “Best Interests of the
Child” and the “Primary Caretaker” Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHOL. REV. 389 (1997)
(describing the approach of states adopting the primary caretaker presumption).
61 See Dowd, supra note 42, at 524-25 (describing the traditional “gendered
differential” in parenting where women assume greater responsibility for childcare and
are more likely to forego paid employment); see also Maldonado, supra note 41, at 942-
43 (describing how fathers are far less likely than mothers to remain consistently
involved in their children’s lives).
62 See Artis, supra note 56, at 787 (“Many judges said that instead of using the
tender years doctrine, they try to discern which parent is the most nurturing, which parent
has the strongest bond, which parent is more emotionally connected to the child, or which
parent spends the most time with the child. Interestingly, several of these judges explained
that mothers are usually the primary caretaker.”); Cheryl Buehler & Jean M. Gerard,
Divorce Law in the United States: A Focus on Child Custody, 44 FAM. REL. 439, 442 (1995)
(“Theoretically, [the primary caretaker] preference is gender neutral (although practically it
favors mothers).”); Jocelyn Elise Crowley, Taking Custody of Motherhood: Fathers’ Rights
Activists and the Politics of Parenting, 37 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 223, 237 (2009) (“The primary
care-giver standard on its face is gender neutral, although undoubtedly, given the current
division of childcare labor within the majority of American homes, women would still be
granted physical custody more often than men.”).
63 See Huntington, supra note 14, at 170 (“[T]raditional gender norms,
establishing economic support as the sine qua non of fatherhood and day-to-day caregiving
as the hallmark of motherhood, still inform much of family law’s approach to legal
regulation, particularly in the conception of legal fatherhood.”); Artis, supra note 56, at 770-
71, 83 (reporting on a 2004 study of family court judges in Indiana in which more than half
of the judges revealed that they continued to support the tender years presumption after its
formal abolition and that they imposed that presumption in court). Moreover, although the
tender years presumption has been formally abandoned in virtually all jurisdictions, a
maternal preference for the custody of young children still often explicitly assists the court
in tie breaking tough custody contests. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 52 So. 3d 1221, 1228
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (reaffirming the tender years doctrine as a presumption in cases
involving young children, especially daughters). Contemporary cases also reveal the
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C. Children’s Welfare and Protection of State Coffers
The roots of the differential valuation of paternal roles can
also be traced to the state’s interest in the welfare of children and
in the protection of state coffers. Although benign, these interests
have helped shape the contours of a legal system that values
fathers only for finances and perpetuates traditional gender roles
in the family. Throughout its existence in imposing parental
obligations, child support law has been guided by the dual goals of
ensuring children’s welfare and protecting the government’s fiscal
interests.64 Since women have traditionally comprised a smaller
proportion of the workforce and have received less remuneration
for their work,65 fathers have been the logical source of funds to
support children when parents do not cohabit. Therefore, in order
to ensure the best interests of the children, the federal
government and courts have sought funds from the parent most
able to provide those funds.
The state, of course, also has a vital interest in ensuring
that parents support their children, which informs the second of
the dual goals of the child support system: protection of
government finances. Without child support, children are more
likely to become the responsibility of the state. A father’s
voluntary abdication of his parental responsibilities, so the
rationale proceeds, should not become a burden on the state—and
by extension, the taxpayer. Even as far back as the Elizabethan
Poor Laws, this rationale animated the state’s interest in child
enduring strength of judicial assumptions about proper parental roles. See, e.g., Marvell v.
Nichelson, 816 A.2d 527, 531 (Vt. 2002) (affirming a custody decision in favor of the mother
based partially on the consideration that the mother was responsible for more of the
household chores and faulting the father for not taking care of the repair and maintenance
of the home).
64 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the
Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029,
1035-36 (2007) (noting the dual goals of child support as cost recovery and promoting the
best interest of the child); Maria Cancian et al., Child Support: Responsible Fatherhood and
the Quid Pro Quo, 635 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 144 (2011) (citing to the
dual goals of the federal child support program); Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 634, 636 (Iowa 1917)
(holding that the purpose of the child support statute is to protect the state from the
burdens of abandoned children as well as to support children).
65 See Jean Kimmel & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, The Effects of Family Leave on
Wages, Employment, and the Family Wage Gap: Distributional Implications, 15 WASH. U.
J.L. &POL’Y 115, 115-16 (2004) (noting that women have historically been less likely to be
employed and continue to suffer from a gendered wage gap); see also Catherine Ho,
Minding the Gap, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-
04/business/35275502_1_wage-gap-female-workers-paycheck-fairness-act [http://perma.cc/
77BW-V33L] (discussing the gender wage gap and the role of limited female workforce
participation in the gender pay disparity).
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support.66 Several nineteenth-century cases articulate the dual
goals of child support,67 with one Iowa case focusing solely on
child support as an obligation to protect the state and holding
that a father has a duty to support his children so that they do not
become public burdens.68 To this day, the state is involved in the
collection and enforcement of child support obligations with these
dual goals in mind.69
One doesn’t have to search far to unearth the basis for the
legal system’s current valuation of paternal roles. The assumption
that fathers have little role to play in direct nurturing and
caretaking of the child clearly surface in an examination of
traditional child custody law, which branded the father as
secondary or even irrelevant to the nurturance of children. The
primacy of paternal financial support has similarly deep roots in
child support law and in the state’s interest in protecting both
children and the taxpayer.
II. THE VALUATION OF CARETAKING AND BREADWINNING
ROLES IN THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SYSTEM
In aspects of both formal child support law and its
enforcement, our legal system reflects its significant valuation of
fathers’ financial contributions and its comparatively minimal
valuation of fathers’ caretaking. This discrepancy is especially
apparent in the differential enforcement of child support orders
on the one hand, and custody and parenting-time orders on the
other. This Part analyzes each of these facets of the legal system
in turn and considers how implicitly or explicitly they convey the
state’s virtually singular interest in paternal child support and its
apathy toward paternal caretaking. While overt gender neutrality
governs our current legal system, these aspects of formal law and
law-in-action betray the persistent assumptions about parental
behavior embodied in our family law system.
66 See generally Hatcher, supra note 64, at 1035 (noting that the laws were
enacted “[w]ith an aim of indemnifying society from the burden of supporting indigent
children . . . in order to reimburse public aid provided to single mothers and children”).
67 See, e.g., Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668, 672-73 (1855) (holding that the
dual goals of a statute compelling fathers to pay support to their illegitimate children
are to support the children and to indemnify the state); Zilley v. Dunwiddie, 74 N.W.
126, 127 (Wis. 1898) (noting that a father’s duty to support his children is owed to the
child and to the state).
68 Hatcher, supra note 64, at 1037.
69 See Kohn, supra note 1, at 534 & n.110 (discussing the enduring dual goals
of the child support enforcement program).
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A. Prohibition of In-Kind Support
The law’s unwavering focus on a father’s monetary
support without regard to the importance of nonmonetary
paternal caretaking betrays the entrenchment of gender norms.
In child support law’s treatment of in-kind support payments, the
legal system dictates that only formal financial payments can
satisfy a parent’s obligation to his child.
Child support guidelines specify that a parent with a child
support obligation receives no credit for in-kind or informal
monetary contributions to his child.70 Under this ban, for
example, a noncustodial father cannot receive credit for providing
diapers or formula, for taking his child shopping for new
sneakers, or for going on a trip with his child.71 The government’s
interest in such a ban is rational. Through this prohibition, the
government can verify not only that payments are being made,
but also that they are made at an appropriate rate and on a
regular basis—and when they are not, the obligation can be
enforced. The state also seeks to protect custodial parents from
intimate-partner violence and coercion and negotiation about the
satisfaction of child support obligations.
At the same time, the ban on in-kind contributions reflects
the state’s preference for formal financial payments. For low-
income men, the ban degrades the value of nonmonetary
contributions. As one father in Washington, D.C., expressed
about his child support order: “It does not account for the time
and resources I spend, nor the fact that my son’s well-being is
tied to my own.”72 Devaluing a contribution that often
involves direct contact between father and child reinforces
the message that a father’s nonfinancial contributions are
irrelevant and disincentivizes what might be a father’s
positive involvement with his children.
70 See id. at 539-40.
71 See, e.g., Perry v. Whitehead, 10 A.3d 673, 676-77 (Me. 2010) (holding that
a husband’s monthly mortgage payments, as well as his responsibility for all real
estate taxes, insurance, and repairs relating to his wife’s home, were in-kind payments
that did not reduce his child support obligation); Stewart v. Rogers, 92 P.3d 615, 619-20
(Mont. 2004) (holding that a father was not entitled to credit for in-kind contributions);
Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. 96APF06-766, 1997 WL 35539, at *5-7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 30, 1997) (holding that a husband’s expenditures for piano, violin, and ski lessons
for his children were voluntary, in-kind expenses and could not be used to reduce the
amount he owed in child support); In re Marriage of Heiman, No. 01-0848, 2002 WL
1587671, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 19, 2002).
72 Survey conducted by the author with Washington, D.C. fathers (June 12,
2014) (on file with author).
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B. Enforcement of Child Support Orders
The legal system’s treatment of child support nonpayment
expresses and perpetuates the consistent message that men must
fulfill their traditional roles as wage earners regardless of their
ability to do so. In the past 15 years, government programs to
collect child support have become increasingly aggressive, as
mandated by both federal legislation and local statutes.73 Existing
child support enforcement mechanisms reinforce the law’s singular
interest in a father’s breadwinning role. They do so by impeding or
even foreclosing parenting time through the imposition of jail time
and other sanctions for failure to pay child support that prevent a
father from having contact with his children.
Though the government should enforce obligations and
take financial support of children seriously, this enforcement
system was developed for the parent who has the ability to pay.
And it may well be effective at coercing payment from a
recalcitrant parent with the means to meet his obligation.74
When the target is an unemployed or underemployed father
who cannot meet even a minimal obligation, however, the
system is ineffective at best, and significantly damaging to the
well-being of children at worst.
The enforcement system utilizes two general
mechanisms—or sticks—to coerce payment and/or punish
nonpayment. First, a nonpaying parent can be sanctioned for
failure to pay by the withholding of a driver’s or other professional
license.75 For low-income fathers who are unable to meet their
73 See Anna Aizer & Sara McLanahan, The Impact of Child Support Enforcement
on Fertility, Parental Investments, and Child Well-Being, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 28, 28
(2006) (“In response to [increasing childhood poverty and single motherhood], and in an
effort to compel absent fathers to provide financially for their children, federal and state
government officials began pursuing policies designed to strengthen child support
enforcement.”); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 126 (2006)
(“[T]he law of parental obligation has stiffened, with courts and legislatures resorting to ever
more aggressive means of child-support enforcement . . . .”).
74 Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward
Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
617, 619 (2012) (“Although effective in securing payments from noncustodial parents with
the means to pay, the impact of these reforms on no- and low-income noncustodial parents
and their families has been disproportionate and destructive.”); see Elizabeth G. Patterson,
Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s
Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 97 (2008) (“When applied to those who are
willfully refusing to pay though able to do so, use of the contempt sanction to punish or
coerce the recalcitrant parent is an appropriate means of assuring that absent parents take
financial responsibility for the children they have brought into the world.”).
75 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-225.01 (2012) (authorizing the withholding of car
registrations, driver’s licenses, and various professional licenses for failure to pay child
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obligations, such a sanction can directly preclude work
opportunities and access to parenting time. The loss of a license is
likely to be a counterproductive sanction for low-income fathers,
as it will further inhibit their ability to work and financially
provide for their children.
Second, an obligor parent can face incarceration for failure
to pay. A court may find a father in criminal or civil contempt for
his failure to meet his child support obligation.76 Civil contempt
actions threaten a nonpaying parent with incarceration unless or
until he pays.77 The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue
of civil contempt for failure to pay child support in the case of
Turner v. Rogers, holding that a court must inquire into a
contemnor’s ability to pay and find he is willfully withholding
payment before incarcerating him.78 In theory, this holding should
reduce the number of low-income fathers who are incarcerated for
failure to pay child support. In practice, however, judges exercise
broad discretion in determining when an alleged contemnor has
the ability to meet his child support obligation, making it routine
for judges to impute income to fathers who are not working,79
support); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 798 (2015) (authorizing license suspension for failure
to pay child support). See generally Milton C. Lee Jr., Fathering Court: A New Model
for Child Support Enforcement, 51 JUDGES’ J. 24, 25 (2012) (discussing a holistic
approach to child support).
76 See generally CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: INCARCERATION AS THE LAST RESORT PENALTY FOR
NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT 1 (2012) (discussing civil and criminal contempt actions for
nonpayment of child support that could result in incarceration and noting that in many
states, prosecutors bring contempt charges in support cases).
77 Id. (noting that civil contempt proceedings can result in jail time). For
criminal contempt, a nonpaying parent can be sentenced for a set period of time; under
civil contempt, a parent can be incarcerated until he makes his payment. Id. at 5-8
(discussing the differences between civil and criminal contempt and their penalties).
78 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 (2011).
79 See CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, N.J. RULES
OF COURT, App. IX-A (2015) (allowing courts to impute income to noncustodial parents as
full-time minimum wage work, even when records of past work are not available); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-12-203 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 653(5) (2012) (defining
“income” to include “the potential income of a parent who is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed”); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.19.071(6) (2011) (allowing imputation of income to
unemployed and underemployed parents); DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT MGMT. & AUDIT
PROGRAMSTAT. UNIT,WASH. ST. DEP’T OFSOC. &HEALTHSERVS., A STUDY OFWASHINGTON
STATE CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS: EXPLORING THEUNIVERSE OF CASESWITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE 7 (2005), https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sites/default/files/
ESA/dcs/documents/FinalGrant205.pdf [http://perma.cc/2N8F-PRD2] (finding that about
50% of IV-D child support orders used imputed income in Washington State). If a
parent falls into this “willful” category, then income can be imputed even if the parent
has no actual income or has less income than is imputed. SeeWillis v. Willis, 62 S.W.3d
735, 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that evidence of a parent’s ability to work at
a greater income is enough to establish “willful underemployment”); see also Freedman v.
Horike, 809 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding father willfully unemployed
because he conducted activities against company policy that resulted in termination from
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thereby rendering them lawful targets for prosecution. Therefore,
despite Turner, indigent unemployed and underemployed parents
may still lawfully be incarcerated for nonpayment in civil
contempt cases.80
In criminal contempt suits and in misdemeanor
prosecutions,81 prosecutors routinely seek incarceration as
punishment for failure to pay but do not pursue payment of
arrears.82 Incarceration is a common sentence in contempt cases,
with, for example, 13-16% of the South Carolina prison population
serving time for child support-related civil contempt.83
Incarcerating a nonpaying obligor expresses the
seriousness with which the government approaches a child
support obligation and, at the same time, the government’s lack of
his employment). Willful unemployment or underemployment is not limited to parents who
purposefully lower their income to avoid high child support payments. See Willis, 62
S.W.3d at 738 (finding father willfully underemployed when he left a job paying
$30,000 per year to pursue a career with the police department that paid less, even
though his motivation to switch was his unhappiness with the first employment).
80 See SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 7; see alsoMike Brunker, Unable
to Pay Child Support, Poor Parents Land Behind Bars, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Sept. 12,
2011), https://www.schr.org/action/resources/unable_to_pay_child_support_poor_parents_
land_behind_bars [http://perma.cc/36DB-MGMN] (reporting that an Urban Institute study
found that only half of the child support debtors in California jail had any income within the
last two years and that of those who had income, the median was $2,881 per year). Trial
courts have great discretion when determining whether a parent is willfully unemployed or
underemployed. See Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(discussing the court’s discretion to impute income in order to discourage voluntary
unemployment and diminution of compensation).
81 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-401 (West 2007) (establishing the offense of
nonsupport); D.C. CODE § 46-225.02 (2007) (creating a criminal offense for failure to support
a child); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.165(1) (2015) (establishing failure to pay child support as
a felony criminal offense); N.D. CENT. CODEANN. § 12.1-37-01 (2007) (establishing failure to
pay child support as a crime); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.555 (West 2015) (“Criminal
nonsupport is a Class C felony.”); see also SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 75, at 1 (“All
states have criminal statutes that relate to the failure to pay child support.”).
82 See SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 5-8.
83 See Brito, supra note 74, at 618 (citing Brief of Elizabeth G. Patterson and
South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 7, Turner, 113 S. Ct. 2507 (2011)); see also Maureen A. Pirog & Kathleen M. Ziol-
Guest, Child Support Enforcement: Programs and Policies, Impacts and Questions, 25 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 943, 960 (2006) (“Older data from noncustodial parents
collected as part of the Survey of Absent Parents found that 13 percent of survey
respondents in Florida and 6 percent in Ohio had been jailed in an effort to collect child
support.”); Brunker, supra note 80 (noting that “approximately 10,000 men were in jail
for non-payment of child support, representing 1.7 percent of the overall U.S. jail
population”); Douglas Galbi, Incarcerating Child-Support Debtors Without the Benefit of
Counsel, PURPLE MOTES (Mar. 22, 2011), http://purplemotes.net/2011/03/22/persons-in-
jail-for-child-support-debt/ [http://perma.cc/DHM8-8N9M] (“Across the U.S. on an average
day, roughly 50,000 persons are in jail or in prison for [child support] debt.”). See
generally REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE ROULET, CENT. FOR FAM. POL’Y AND PRAC., A
LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR CHILD SUPPORT NONPAYMENT:
ENFORCEMENT, COURT AND PROGRAM PRACTICES 13-38 (2005) (documenting, on a state-
by-state basis, arrests and incarcerations for failures to pay child support).
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concern for the estrangement that incarceration creates in a
parent-child relationship.84 Indeed, incarceration’s potential for
harm usually outweighs the benefits associated with this punitive
measure. For a low-income father, incarceration rarely results in
payment of child support obligations or arrears. Rough estimates
suggest that less than two percent of child support collections can
be associated with the threat of incarceration.85 Further, once
incarcerated, few parents are able to make payments.86 In fact,
the collateral consequences of incarceration exacerbate the
precariousness of a father’s finances. He is unlikely to leave a
period of incarceration with an enhanced ability to provide for his
children if he had been struggling prior to incarceration. One
father in a recent study explained that “[my jail time for
nonpayment of support] really affected me and just put a stain on
me . . . . I wanted to look for a job, you know, and [] that’s
something that I can’t get off my record. I spent 28 years, [] I’ve
never been arrested. I never got in trouble. So now there’s this
one instance with child support and I go to jail.”87 Incarceration
results in myriad nonfinancial consequences for fathers as well,
including mental health effects88 and increased drug and alcohol
use after release.89 The legal system’s focus on enforcing child
support obligations may well serve children whose fathers can
meet their obligations. For children of low-income fathers,
however, this focus often results in further estrangement and
frequently enhances the improbability of payment. When fathers
84 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-401 (West 2007) (establishing that “[a] person
commits the offense of nonsupport if he or she fails to provide support to the person’s
[l]egitimate child who is less than (18) years of age”); 2014 Minn. Laws 1 (“Whoever is
legally obligated to provide care and court-ordered support to a spouse or child, whether or
not the child’s custody has been granted to another, and knowingly omits and fails to do so
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.”); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 568.040 (West 2011) (providing that “[c]riminal nonsupport is a class A
misdemeanor, unless the total arrearage is in excess of an aggregate of twelve monthly
payments due under any order of support issued by any court of competent jurisdiction or
any authorized administrative agency, in which case it is a class D felony”); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 163.555(5) (West 2015) (“Criminal nonsupport is a Class C felony.”); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-101 (West 2013) (distinguishing between nonsupport as a Class A
misdemeanor and flagrant nonsupport as a Class E felony).
85 SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 3.
86 Id.
87 JACQUELYN BOGGESS ET AL., WHATWEWANT TOGIVEOURKIDS: HOW CHILD
SUPPORT DEBT CAN DIMINISH WEALTH-BUILDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRUGGLING
BLACK FATHERS AND THEIR FAMILIES 13 (2014), http://www.cffpp.org/publications/
whatwewanttogiveourkids.pdf [http://perma.cc/CZS7-6NGX].
88 SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 14 (noting that commentators
assert that incarceration negatively affects a prisoner’s mental health).
89 Id. (noting commentators who have found that after incarceration, many
former prisoners “self-medicate” with alcohol and drugs).
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who cannot pay are sanctioned or imprisoned for failure to pay,
they are more likely to fall further behind in payments or to
become absent than they are to spontaneously find the means to
meet their child support obligations.
C. Differential Enforcement of Child Support Orders and
Parenting-Time Orders
The difference between the court’s enforcement of child
support orders on one hand and parenting-time orders on the
other conveys a salient message about the legal system’s
valuation of paternal roles. As discussed above, child support is a
responsibility that the court enforces through a range of coercive
and punitive measures. In contrast, when a noncustodial parent
violates a parenting-time order by failing to show up for visits,
judges refrain from enforcing the obligation. Visitation and
custody are characterized as rights to be taken advantage of at a
noncustodial father’s discretion.90 So although a judge may well
grant a father regular parenting time or joint custody with
extensive residential time with his child, a father’s decision to
take advantage of that time remains his own.91
When mothers file suit to enforce visitation and custody
agreements because fathers have abdicated their parenting-time
rights, judges rule that fathers can only be encouraged but not
forced to parent.92 For example, an Illinois court held that it could
not order a reluctant father to visit with his children:
90 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Essay, From Genes, Marriage and Money to
Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 133 (2003) (“[M]ens’
ability to nurture and parent, however, has remained far secondary to defining men’s
role as purely economic, with the classic paradigm of the breadwinner.”).
91 One scholar asserts that legal decisionmaking regarding caretaking after the
dissolution of the family perpetuates social norms to such a point that fathers are treated as
volunteers and mothers as draftees. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1436-42 (1991). As long as a child
has not been abandoned or neglected by both parents, courts generally refuse to intervene to
mandate parental engagement. Courts will terminate parental rights if abandonment is
willful. However, there is a high bar for finding willful abandonment. See, e.g., Hardy v.
Gunter, 577 S.E.2d 231, 235-37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding father’s failure to visit does not
amount to abandonment); White v. Farley, No. E2005-00396-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL
2604050, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005) (affirming decision to deny termination of
parental rights for abandonment); K.S.O.H. v. J.W.B., Jr., No. E2001-00055-COA-R3-CV,
2001 WL 1173302, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2001) (upholding lower court’s refusal to
terminate parental rights for abandonment).
92 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d 167, 171-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(holding that the court will not force a father to visit against his will); Jennifer Diane D. v.
Arnold D., 589 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (upholding lower court’s refusal to
require visitation against a father’s will); Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a court may encourage but not compel a noncustodial parent to visit with his
children); Louden v. Olpin, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
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First of all, a court simply cannot order a parent to love his or her
children or to maintain a meaningful relationship with them. We are
not convinced that forcing the children to spend time with a parent
who views the visit as a punishment or obligation would truly be in
the children’s best interests. Any feelings of abandonment the
children may have might actually be reinforced by the realization
that their father (or mother) was seeing them only to avoid being
jailed for contempt of court.93
Another court acknowledged that the father’s absence
would detrimentally affect his relationship with his daughter.94
It held, however, that coerced visitation would not be in the
best interest of the child95:
We are inclined to believe that visitation motivated solely by the
threat of contempt could not truly be said to satisfy a child’s best
interest. . . . While we are sympathetic to [the mother’s] plight, we
are not convinced that visits coerced by threat of incarceration would
be much better than no visits at all. [The father] will understand
soon enough the error of his ways. No court order can make up for
the loss of his daughters’ affection and respect.96
Indeed, enforcing visitation through coercive means is unlikely to
achieve a result that is in the best interest of a child. Even given
the constitutional and practical limitations on enforcement,
however, a court is not left with only apathy or shoulder
shrugging when confronted by a father who is not taking
advantage of his parenting-time rights, as discussed in Section
IV.B. In actively abdicating involvement in these cases, the legal
system reinforces the minimal value it assigns to paternal
engagement.97 In the end, even despite the increasing gender
equity principles behind legal rules, the differential enforcement
of these orders compared to the enforcement of child support
obligations persists in conveying the message that men’s
responsibilities to their children end at financial support and that
any other support is purely discretionary.
court “cannot order [the noncustodial parent] to act as a father”); McKinley v. Iowa Dist.
Court for Polk Cty., 542 N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Iowa 1996) (declining to hold a father in
contempt for his failure to visit with his children despite a divorce decree granting him
visitation); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407, cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 1974) (“[A] judge should never compel the noncustodial
parent . . . .”).
93 Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d at 172.
94 McKinley, 542 N.W.2d at 825-26.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 As Professor Czapanskiy argued, “the only mandatory aspect of the unwed
father’s relationship with the child is financial. . . . At the same time, no mandatory
duty has developed with respect to the family or personal relationship between father
and child.” Czapanskiy, supra note 91, at 1418; see infra Section IV.B.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM’SHIERARCHY OF
PATERNAL VALUES
The legal system’s justifications for its significant interest
in fathers’ financial contributions are sound. Concern about
children’s welfare, a mother’s ability to provide for her child’s
needs, and the fairness of burdening the taxpayers with the
support of children whose fathers are unable to take on that role
are legitimate considerations. Aggressively enforcing child
support obligations seems appropriate, given these goals. But
doggedly privileging financial contributions from low-income men
without consideration of their ability to pay, while simultaneously
remaining apathetic to their parental involvement, has collateral
consequences that interfere with the legal system’s ultimate goals
and with the best interests of children. The system’s long-
standing focus on the monetary contributions of fathers and its
failure to support or encourage paternal caretaking has
significant implications for fathers, mothers, children, and even
for the state itself.
A. Implications of Skewed Values for Fathers
The legal system’s differential valuation of breadwinning
and nurturing roles is evident to fathers as they interact with the
system.98 For a low-income father with child support debt, his
interactions with the legal system convey an unavoidable
message that financial support is the only way to fulfill a parental
role that is recognized, encouraged, and mandated. As one father
noted, “They ask fathers why they don’t stay more involved? Well,
the system, the whole system, says to them ‘All we need is your
money, we don’t need you as a person . . . .’ They drive you
away.”99 Another father in the District of Columbia reported that
he feels the court is more interested in him paying child support
than in him spending time with his children, adding that the
98 See, e.g., EDIN&NELSON, supra note 4, at 18 (“These disadvantaged dads recoil
at the notion that they are just a paycheck . . . .”); Huntington, supra note 14, at 211 (“By
sending the message that the only ‘parenting’ required of fathers is that they pay child
support, marital family law underscores the economic failure of fathers and devalues the
caregiving that fathers try to offer.”); CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH
SERVICE, FATHERHOOD INITIATIVES: CONNECTING FATHERS TO THEIR CHILDREN 13 (2014)
(noting that policy analysts have argued that fathers are “devalued when their role in their
children’s lives is based solely on their cash contributions”).
99 TERRY ARENDELL, FATHERS&DIVORCE 83 (1995).
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court “only sees us as black men not taking care of their children
and that’s not always true.”100
The values embodied by child support law and enforcement
also have many direct practical influences on paternal behavior.
First, the prohibition of in-kind contributions to meet child
support obligations disincentivizes direct contact with children
and collaboration with the custodial parent to help meet the
family’s needs. Second, child support enforcement, with obligations
established based on imputed income or set at unrealistically high
levels, coupled with the threat of jail time for noncompliance, can
result in fathers leaving the formal economy and, in some
instances, disappearing from the lives of their children.101
Third, incarceration has a clear and direct effect on the
parent-child relationship. Over 60% of inmates in state prison
and 80% of inmates in federal prison are housed more than 100
miles from their homes,102 and a study of fathers in prison
revealed that almost 42% of fathers who had not lived with their
children prior to incarceration had contact with their children on
only a monthly basis or less.103
For incarcerated fathers—many of whom are, ironically,
often jailed for failing to meet child support obligations—child
support arrears can be particularly crippling.104 State laws
inconsistently assess the relevance of incarceration to child
support obligations.105 In some states, incarceration suspends
100 Author survey, supra note 72.
101 See, e.g., Hatcher, supra note 44, at 784 (“Facing unrealistically high child
support orders and having up to 65% of their net wages garnished, many low-income
fathers have no other realistic choice than to leave the ‘above ground’ economy. These
fathers are more likely to engage in criminal activities, less likely to receive medical
care, less likely to pay taxes, less likely to pay child support, and less likely to have a
positive relationship with the mothers of their children.”).
102 EMILY SANDERS & RACHEL DUNIFON, CORNELL COOPERATIVE EXTENSION,
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 4 (2011).
103 LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 6 (2008),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8LJ-8E2G].
104 See generally Ann Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions: The Hidden
Costs of Aggressive Child Support Enforcement Against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313 (2006) (discussing the crippling effects of child support
enforcement, particularly on fathers who have recently been released from incarceration);
Hatcher, supra note 44, at 785 (discussing the effect of child support arrears on formerly
incarcerated fathers).
105 See Cancian et al., supra note 64, at 151-52 (discussing various jurisdictions’
approaches to child support obligations and incarceration); OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REALISTIC CHILD SUPPORT
ORDERS FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS (2012) (providing an overview of the state of the law
regarding incarceration and child support obligations and highlighting programs that
address the inability of an incarcerated parent to meet his/her obligation).
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child support obligations,106 while other states consider jail time
to be voluntary unemployment and continue to toll arrears.107
For fathers who leave jail with significant arrears, obtaining
employment and meeting child support obligations becomes
exponentially more difficult, making it more likely that these
fathers will hide from enforcement of these orders and, by
extension, from their families.108
As such, the legal system exacerbates the many forces that
alienate noncustodial fathers from their children.109 Social
scientists have long studied father absence and point to wide-
ranging cultural, sociological, economic, and psychosocial
explanations.110 To the extent the legal system makes it difficult
for a father to feel appreciated as anything other than a financial
resource, its message merely adds to the multitude of forces that
influence father absence, which has been increasing in recent
106 See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 902 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ind. 2009) (holding
imprisonment can constitute a “changed circumstance,” allowing for suspension of child
support arrearage during incarceration); Leasure v. Leasure, 549 A.2d 225, 227-28 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (holding the support obligation was properly suspended when obligor had
no assets from which to derive income); see also Kuron v. Hamilton, 752 A.2d 752, 757 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding voluntary conduct, including incarceration, may allow for
suspension of child support arrears); Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 336-39 (Md. 1995)
(holding that obligor’s incarceration justified modification of child support award).
107 See, e.g., TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-2-4-.04(3)(a)(2)(i)(I) (2008) (explicitly
stating that incarceration will be treated as voluntary unemployment),
http://share.tn.gov/sos/rules/1240/1240-02/1240-02-04.20080815.pdf [http://perma.cc/WMY9-
5M6T]; Kentucky ex rel. Marshall v. Marshall, 15 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that incarceration shall be treated as voluntary unemployment); State v. Nelson,
587 So. 2d 176, 177-78 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (finding father’s voluntary actions that affected
his income, including incarceration, could not justify the extinction of child support
obligations and did not constitute a “change in circumstances”).
108 See Brito, supra note 74, at 658 (noting the negative effects of incarceration
on employment prospects); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining
Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1014 (2006) (discussing the
effect of enforcement on fathers, including sending them into hiding and making them
less desirable employees); Blaine Harden, ‘Dead Broke’ Dads’ Child-Support Struggle,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/29/us/dead-broke-dads-
child-support-struggle.html [http://perma.cc/8RGD-C9YQ] (noting that the current
system of child support enforcement encourages poor fathers to hide from enforcement
and from their families).
109 The connection between a system that sends a message to low-income
fathers with arrears that they are irrelevant to their children and father absence is
well supported by logic and science. A hypothesis informed by biology posits that
fathers will remain connected with their children if their presence is useful to their
children. For a discussion of Catherine Franssen’s research on mice and fatherhood,
see RAEBURN, supra note 18, at 91-103. By considering and enforcing only financial
paternal contributions, the legal system reinforces the notion that a father is otherwise
of little use to his children.
110 See Jessica Dixon Weaver, The First Father: Perspectives on the President’s
Fatherhood Initiative, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 297, 300-04 (2012) (providing a historical
overview of the prevailing analyses of father absence and its causes).
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decades.111 In one large-scale study of the general population of
families with nonresidential fathers, mothers reported that 34%
of fathers had no contact with the child’s household at all.112 The
statistics related to fragile families—those families in which the
parents never marry—reveal that fathers are even less likely to
be present.113 Based on the 2006 Current Population Report, 3.7
million unmarried mothers reported that about 40% of fathers
had no contact with their children within the prior year.114 The
Fragile Families Report of 2010 compiled consistent results,
illustrating that one year after their child’s birth, 37% of
nonresident fathers did not visit with their children on a regular
basis, defined as at least one time a month.115 Data show that as
children grow, fathers in fragile families become even less
engaged; by the time the child is five years old, 49% of fathers fail
to see their children on a regular basis.116
These statistics are troublesome given their dissonance
with the stated intentions and aspirations of nonresidential
fathers. A large-scale study of fragile families in 16 out of the 20
largest American cities focused on mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes
shortly after the birth of a child and reported that a “high”
percentage of all unmarried fathers in the study asserted that
they wanted to be involved in raising their child.117 Further,
multiple studies illustrate that many low-income fathers claim
they want to be involved but that economic disadvantages
111 Geoffrey L. Greif et al., Working with Urban, African American Fathers:
The Importance of Service Provision, Joining, Accountability, the Father-Child
Relationship, and Couples Work, 14 J. FAM. SOC. WORK 247, 249 (2011) (“Fathers often
lose contact with their children after the breakup of the parenting relationship, leaving
children to be raised by single mothers in increasing numbers.” (citing U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, 2008)).
112 Robert I. Lerman, Capabilities and Contributions of Unwed Fathers, 20
FUTURE OF CHILD. 63, 74 (2011).
113 See generally CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD & NICHOLAS ZILL, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NON-CUSTODIAL PARENTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THEIR
CHILDREN’S LIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION (1996) (arguing that frequency of father contact correlates to family
structure, including whether the parties are married or not). Indeed, the frequency of
visitation by nonresident fathers tends to decrease as the years pass. HEATHER KOBALL
& DESIREE PRINCIPE, URBAN INST., DO NONRESIDENT FATHERS WHO PAY CHILD
SUPPORT VISIT THEIR CHILDREN MORE? 4 (2002), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/
310438.pdf [http://perma.cc/44UU-C9VZ] (citation omitted).
114 Lerman, supra note 112, at 73.
115 Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile
Families, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD. 17, 22 (2010).
116 Id. This population is of particular interest because it disproportionately
includes traditionally more marginalized members of our society. Approximately 70% of
African-American babies and 50% of Hispanic babies are born to unmarried parents. Id.
117 SARA MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND WELLBEING STUDY:
BASELINENATIONAL REPORT 9-10 (2003).
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hamper their ability to remain engaged.118 These studies suggest
that despite the reality that some fathers willingly abdicate their
relationships with their children, father absence is not a natural
inclination for a sizeable proportion of fathers. For these fathers,
the implications of the differential value the legal system assigns
paternal roles can be real and relevant to them, the mothers of
their children, and their children.
B. Implications of Skewed Values for Mothers
Mothers are affected on multiple levels by the differential
valuation of paternal roles. The system’s apathy toward paternal
caretaking carries one set of implications and its focus on
financial contributions another. On the one hand, the low value
the legal system assigns to paternal engagement may benefit
mothers who want to keep fathers out of their lives and their
children’s lives.119 Mothers may want to maintain distance from
their children’s fathers for a variety of reasons, such as intimate-
partner violence,120 controlling behavior,121 risky conduct,122
infidelity,123 poor judgment,124 or frequent incarceration.125 By
118 ELAINE SORENSEN & MARK TURNER, NAT’L CTR. ON FATHERS AND
FAMILIES, BARRIERS IN CHILD SUPPORT POLICY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 15 (1996),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED454978.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4VR-N4X7] (noting after
reviewing multiple studies that “[t]hese studies amply suggest that many fathers do
want to be involved, but suffer from economic disadvantages and a lack of skills and
resources that inhibit or undermine these desires over time”).
119 Reports of “maternal gatekeeping,” or mothers restricting fathers’ access to
children, suggest that it is not uncommon for mothers to intentionally try to distance
fathers. See generally Marsha Kline Pruett et al., The Hand That Rocks the Cradle:
Maternal Gatekeeping After Divorce, 27 PACE L. REV. 709, 713-14 (2007) (discussing the
prevalence of maternal gatekeeping as a way for mothers to control fathers’
interactions). Pruett asserts that maternal gatekeeping is relatively common.
More restrictive gatekeeping occurs in about one-quarter of the married
couples that have been studied, and it occurs more often in divorced contexts
even if the nonresidential fathers are as involved as those living with their
children are. It may occur even more often among non-married, separating
couples, as these fathers report more obstacles to access posed by their ex-
partners than do their married-but divorcing counterparts.
Id. at 716-17.
120 KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 94-97 (2005) (discussing mothers’
accounts of fathers’ violent behavior that led to the end of their relationships).
121 See id. at 59 (discussing the instances of fathers trying to exercise an
almost “maniacal control over their baby’s mother”).
122 Id. at 81-84 (discussing the frequency of drug dealing among fathers and
mothers’ blindness to the risks that poses for the family).
123 Id. at 81 (stating that four in ten women in their study explained that a
father’s inability to stay faithful led to the relationship’s demise).
124 Id. at 78-81, 84-87 (discussing the mothers in her study who reported that
their relationships with fathers end because the mothers become fed up with fathers’
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restricting fathers’ access, mothers may seek to protect
themselves and their children from harm.
Further, as Kathryn Edin revealed in her study of inner-
city, low-income mothers, Promises I Can Keep, mothers cite to
parenthood as central to their self-esteem, self-worth, and success
in life.126 Maintaining control over their children without the
interference of an unstable and unpredictable coparent is one way
to protect this valuable asset. A legal system that enforces a
father’s sole role as a financial provider but does not support,
encourage, or mandate any other parenting can be consistent
with a mother’s wishes. On the other hand, many mothers
welcome, invite, and crave the involvement of their children’s
fathers.127 They seek not only the financial support the fathers
owe, but also the assistance, role modeling, and love that fathers
have the potential to provide.128
Separately, mothers might also stand to benefit from a
system that supports fathers in taking on more caretaking
responsibilities. By disrupting the gendered social norms and
expectations of fathers as breadwinners over caregivers,
mothers might be more liberated to take part in the market
economy, to pursue financial opportunities, and to do so while
facing less entrenched bias.129
Even if the legal system were to place less emphasis on
monetary child support payments, the implications of this change
for the mother would depend on an array of factors. The most
relevant factor would be a father’s ability to pay. In the best-case
scenario, the legal system’s emphasis on child support collection
spending habits and their refusal to maintain jobs, and ultimately, “drug and alcohol
abuse, the criminal behavior and consequent incarceration, the repeated infidelity, and
the patterns of intimate violence [] are the villains looming largest in poor mothers’
accounts of relational failure”).
125 Id. at 81 (stating that one in three mothers said that crime and the
consequent incarceration led to the relationship’s demise).
126 Id. at 168-85 (discussing and analyzing the benefits of self-esteem,
security, and pride that mothers derive from motherhood).
127 See Marcia J. Carlson & Sara S. McLanahan, Fragile Families, Father
Involvement, and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 461, 468 (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha
Cabrera eds., 2002) (citing studies illustrating that over 90% of unmarried mothers
want fathers to help raise the child).
128 See, e.g., EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 120, at 208-10 (reporting from their
study that poor women are more likely than middle class women “to say [that] they
believe . . . a child raised by two parents [fares] better” than one raised by a single parent).
129 See generally Doucet, supra note 42 (discussing, among other topics, the
salutary effects on women’s opportunities if men were to partake more in caretaking).
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would result in full satisfaction of child support payments.130
When full payment is secured, custodial mothers certainly
benefit. In contrast, if the system falls short of effective child
support enforcement—as it most often does among low-income
obligors131—custodial mothers reap little benefit from the legal
system’s myopic focus on child support. They receive little money
from fathers and stand on the sidelines as the system enhances
paternal hostility and threatens to further alienate fathers.
Further, the child support system’s emphasis on formal
monetary payments and the requirement that custodial parents
on Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) comply with child
support enforcement to locate fathers and to assign their rights to
child support to the government132 can pit mothers and fathers
against each other. Such requirements also preclude private
ordering between parents, which would allow them to bargain
and negotiate as needed and as possible to meet their children’s
needs. Enforcement can alienate a father to the point that he can
become unwilling to work with the mother to best support their
child.133 Although for some mothers—particularly those who have
been subject to intimate-partner violence—such informal
bargaining is fraught with risks of coercion and manipulation,
other mothers report highly valuing such dealings.134 One study of
mothers on public benefits in four U.S. cities found that those
mothers acted strategically
to maximize their family’s economic and emotional well-being and those
decisions did not always mean working within the formal child support
enforcement system. On the contrary, [some mothers] . . . were actually
better off because they received from the absent father more than [they
would have gotten through] formal child support enforcement.135
130 This assumes that the father is making payments from legal sources of
income and without excessive hostility toward the mother. Illegal income and hostility
could render even full payments problematic for mothers and children.
131 See supra Section III.A (discussing the limitations of child support
enforcement among low-income fathers).
132 Under mandatory assignment, custodial parents on TANF must assign
their rights to child support payments that exceed their TANF benefit to the
government as reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2012); D.C. Code Ann. § 4-
205.19(b) (West 2015); see also Kohn, supra note 1, at 534-36 (discussing assignment).
133 See generally Elizabeth Stuart, How Anti-Poverty Programs Marginalize
Fathers, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/
02/how-anti-poverty-programs-marginalize-fathers/283984/ [http://perma.cc/C4E6-G4NG]
(explaining that child support enforcement can have a negative effect on children by
providing an incentive for mothers to withhold their children from fathers and forcing
fathers underground to avoid incarceration for failure to meet child support obligations).
134 See Kohn, supra note 1, at 535.
135 SORENSEN& TURNER, supra note 118, at 9.
2015] MONEY CAN’T BUY YOU LOVE 83
It is the mothers who seek both nonmonetary support and
engagement from low-income noncustodial fathers who are most
often at odds with a legal system that aggressively pursues
fathers for their monetary contributions but is apathetic or
obstructionist in the face of paternal engagement. As a result, the
system leaves custodial mothers without financial resources or
support to establish and enforce their realistic parenting plans.
In the end, there appears to be a chicken and egg problem.
Mothers seem to prefer paternal involvement, but only when that
involvement is positive and when fathers demonstrate a track
record of support and responsibility. That track record, however,
is hard to build for fathers with limited resources in a legal
system that discourages caretaking and may impede fathers from
providing financial support. Fathers also report that they are
reluctant to be involved when they feel disapproval from
mothers.136 By equalizing the value the legal system assigns to
paternal roles, this problem could be addressed to some degree.
Fathers, in receiving increased recognition of their efforts to
nurture and provide financial support, might show up for their
children more often and more responsibly. In doing so, mothers
might want them around with increased frequency. Of course, the
recalibration of the values assigned to paternal roles will not
address every reason a mother may choose to exclude a father
from the lives of her children—most notably intrafamily violence.
But a rebalancing of these roles would not force mothers to
involve fathers who endanger them or their children. Instead, a
reassessment would allow the legal system and the parents
themselves to determine how best to support children through
parental involvement—facilitating rather than inhibiting
parental involvement in appropriate cases. As a result of such
changes to the legal system, some of the destructive and
disappointing cycles of paternal behavior might be remedied.
C. Implications of Skewed Values for Children
Though one of the central goals of the federal child support
system is to enhance the welfare of children, aggressive
enforcement of child support responsibilities against low-income
fathers often fails to result in increased payments. Child support
enforcement against men who lack the means to meet their
136 See Debra A. Madden-Derdich & Stacie A. Leonard, Parental Role Identity and
Fathers’ Involvement in Coparental Interaction after Divorce: Fathers’ Perspectives, 49 FAM.
REL. 311, 313 (2000) (“[F]athers who do not perceive that the child’s mother is supportive of
them as a parent, are less likely to display high levels of parental involvement.”).
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obligations may, in fact, reduce payments that might otherwise be
made. In perpetuating father absence, aggressive enforcement
might also affirmatively put children at greater risk for a range of
negative outcomes.137
The child support program has not been successful in
reducing childhood poverty because the children of low-income
fathers receive little money from these enforcement efforts.138 In
2010, for example, child support payments to families receiving
public assistance comprised only four percent of the cases for
which child support was collected by enforcement efforts.139 And
even if a father makes his child support payments to his child
who happens to be on TANF, the government captures at least
part, if not all, of that payment as reimbursement for government
welfare expenditures.140 As a result, even in those limited
instances where the fathers of the most financially needy children
make child support payments, little of that money actually
benefits the child.
Finally, the system’s effect on father absence has direct
implications for the well-being of children. Over many decades,
social scientists have analyzed the effects of father absence on
children. While some debate still exists,141 many studies have
137 See RAEBURN, supra note 18, at 223 (“Efforts to encourage father
involvement by focusing on increasing absent fathers’ child-support payments did not
work out so well. The problem was that absent fathers often didn’t have the resources
to make the payments.”).
138 See BOGGESS, supra note 87, at 2 (2014) (citing that “70 percent []of custodial
parents with children living in poverty receive no child support”); Cancian et al., supra note
64, at 153 (noting that studies show “a fairly modest impact of child support” on low-income
families, “in large part because in a given year, a majority of poor families do not receive any
payments”); see also TANF Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin.,
107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Vicki Turetsky, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law
and Social Policy), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051602vttest.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J99A-HRCR] [hereinafter Welfare Reauthorization] (arguing that the
narrow focus on punishing nonsupporting fathers without any measures to make it easier
for poor fathers to make regular child support payments might be an appealing
symbolic way to enforce personal responsibility, but it does little to promote the welfare
of American children).
139 Brito, supra note 74, at 647-48.
140 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2012).
141 See Valarie King, Variation in the Consequences of Nonresident Father
Involvement for Children’s Well-Being, 56 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 963, 963, 971 (1994)
(asserting that the majority of studies have found little association between father
visitation and child well-being); Maldonado, supra note 41, at 950-52 (citing the various
studies that debate the effects of father absence on children); Judith S. Wallerstein &
Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the
Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 312 (1996) (“There is no
evidence in Dr. Wallerstein’s work of many years, including the ten and fifteen year
longitudinal study, or in that of any other research, that frequency of visiting or
amount of time spent with the noncustodial parent over the child’s entire growing-up
years is significantly related to good outcome in the child or adolescent.”).
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concluded that absent substantial parental conflict,142 violence,
or abuse, healthy father involvement suggests positive
outcomes for children, while paternal absence correlates to a
range of negative outcomes.143
Studies have illustrated that for children who seek
relationships with their fathers, paternal interactions can have a
significant positive emotional impact.144 Many studies have also
chronicled the correlation between father absence and diminished
levels of school achievement.145 Further, children without access
to their fathers are also disproportionately represented among
142 Studies have concluded that when conflict between parents is high, frequent
visitation can be detrimental to children. See Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children’s
Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk and Resilience Perspectives, 52 FAM. REL. 352, 365
(2003) (“In the context of low conflict, frequent visits between fathers and children is
associated with better child adjustment, but where interparental conflict is intense, more
frequent visits were linked to poorer adjustment, presumably because of the opportunities
for more direct exposure of the children to parental aggression and pressures.” (citations
omitted)); Daniel Pollack & Susan Mason, Mandatory Visitation: In the Best Interest of the
Child, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 75 (2004) (citing multiple studies of black adolescent males and
reporting that the studies concluded that when interparental tension is high, “frequent
visitation [with] the noncustodial parent” can be damaging to the child’s well-being).
143 See RAEBURN, supra note 18, at 121-80 (providing an overview of studies on
the relevance of fathers to show that at various ages, from infancy to teenage years,
and for girls and boys alike, a positive relationship with a father has been shown to be
correlated with childhood health and success); Valarie King et al., Racial and Ethnic
Diversity in Nonresident Father Involvement, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1, 2-3 (2004)
(stating that studies have consistently found that children who grow up apart from
their fathers suffer adverse consequences).
144 See, e.g., KOBALL&PRINCIPE, supra note 113, at 1 (“Children often desire more
contact with their nonresident fathers. In fact, children of divorce reported that the most
negative outcome of their parents’ divorce was reduced contact with their fathers.” (citation
omitted)); Erin Kramer Holmes et al., Marriage, Fatherhood, and Parenting Programming,
in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 438, 439
(Natasha J. Cabrera & Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda eds., 2013) (citing studies that
illustrate how positive father presence yields “healthy family outcomes”); Paul R. Amato et
al., Changes in Nonresident Father-Child Contact from 1976-2002, 58 FAM. REL. 41, 43
(2009) (citing a study concluding “that young adults with divorced parents felt closer to their
fathers, less abandoned by their fathers, less angry toward their mothers, and more
favorable about the postdivorce years when they had regular contact with their fathers
during childhood”); Lois M. Collins & Marjorie Cortez, Why Dads Matter: A Third of
American Children Are Growing Up in Homes Without Their Biological Fathers, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/02/why-dads-matter/
283956/ [http://perma.cc/4DU4-XKVD] (citing to studies showing that fathers can have a
positive emotional impact on their infants and children); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note
141, at 312 (“A child who feels abandoned or rejected by a father suffers tragically, often
turning the feelings back on himself or herself as unworthy of being loved.”).
145 See, e.g., Brent McBride et al., The Mediating Role of Fathers’ School
Involvement on Student Achievement, 26 J. APPLIEDDEV. PSYCH. 201, 213 (2005) (reporting
on his study that found a correlation between school performance and father presence and
explaining that “[b]y taking a more active role in their children’s education, fathers may
enhance the resources that are available to their children as they attempt to cope with the
negative impact of risk factors commonly associated with family income”).
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children in the juvenile justice system.146 Girls have been found to
be at greater risk for adolescent pregnancy and early sexual
activity when they do not have significant contact with their
fathers.147 These negative effects of father absence are particularly
present at the intersection of poverty and single parenthood,
where custodial families do not have the financial or social capital
to overcome paternal absence.148
Some studies of father absence have attributed negative
child outcomes to the diminished financial resources that result
from father absence—rather than to a lack of paternal
engagement.149 Other studies have concluded that visitation and
child support have equally prophylactic effects on the consequences
of living without a father in the home.150 Regardless of the relative
effects, it is clear that when fathers positively engage with their
children, absent high parental conflict or violence, fathers play
important social and financial roles in the lives and future
successes of their children. The legal system’s valuation of
paternal roles has wide-ranging implications for children.
Children stand to be significantly harmed by a legal system that
blindly pursues fathers for financial support without regard to
their roles as emotional caretakers.
146 See Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth
Incarceration, 14 J. OF RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 369, 375 (2004) (citing a long-term study on
father absence and youth incarceration involving over 6,000 adolescent males illustrating
a correlation between the two that cannot be explained away by coexisting factors).
Significantly, though this study also measured the correlation between the absence of
child support and youth incarceration, it did not find a correlation. Id. at 386.
147 See Bruce J. Ellis et al., Does Father Absence Place Daughters at Special
Risk for Early Sexual Activity and Teenage Pregnancy?, 74 CHILD DEV. 801, 811-15
(2003) (citing a study of 242 girls in the United States that concluded that father
absence was strongly associated with increased risk for early sexual activity and
adolescent pregnancy).
148 See EILEEN MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 130-31 (2002) (pointing to study results illustrating
that the coexistence of poverty and separated parents puts children at increased risk
for academic and psychological issues).
149 See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 41, at 961(“[I]t is well established that
children whose fathers pay child support tend to experience fewer behavioral and social
problems and to perform better in school than children whose fathers do not.”); Pollack &
Mason, supra note 142, at 75 (“Consistent child support was found to be a more positive
influence overall than was visitation . . . [on child well-being in a separated family].”).
150 See Jennifer F. Hamer, What African-American Noncustodial Fathers Say
Inhibits and Enhances Their Involvement with Children, 22 W. J. BLACK STUD. 117,
117 (1998) (noting that some researchers concluded that a father’s provision of social
and emotional support is as important as financial support).
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D. Implications of Skewed Values for the State
The federal and state child support enforcement
mechanism requires significant state expenditures.151 Despite the
significant cost of the child support enforcement program,
aggressive child support enforcement against low-income fathers
has failed to yield significant benefits for the state. Low-income
noncustodial parents owe the vast majority of outstanding child
support debt152—by some estimates around 70%.153 The limited
return on the government’s aggressive child-support enforcement
program of the last 15 years is underscored by the reality that
child support collections have remained flat over the last 30
years.154 That low return is largely due to the futility of seeking to
collect from parents who are simply unable to meet their
obligations. The enforcement program has been repeatedly
criticized for its failure to distinguish between fathers who are
able but are willfully shunning their child support obligations and
those who are truly unable to meet their obligations.155
In fact, data unambiguously illustrate that many
fathers with arrears are truly unable to meet their obligations,
and enforcement through penalties, contempt, criminal
prosecution, and mounting arrears is futile—not to mention
counterproductive—when considering the best interests of the
child and the finances of the state. Recent data illustrate that the
average income of unmarried nonresident fathers is $17,000 at
the time of the child’s birth.156 Between 34% and 43% of fathers of
children on welfare live below the poverty line.157 As a practical
matter, this group of fathers does not present fertile ground for
151 ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 274 (2012),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/olab/2012_all.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QTG-6QVP]
(estimating the money paid to states for child support enforcement as just under $4 billion);
see also Hatcher, supra note 64, at 1070-74 (arguing that state enforcement efforts “result[]
in minimal benefit to the government’s net finances and possibly even a loss”).
152 Brito, supra note 74, at 619.
153 ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., URBAN INST., ASSESSING CHILD SUPPORT
ARREARS INNINE LARGE STATES AND THENATION 22 (2007).
154 Cancian et al., supra note 64, at 149.
155 See, e.g., Brito, supra note 74, at 664-65 (“An assumption that all nonpaying
fathers are deadbeats is inequitable and unjust, especially in light of the current
recession and historically high unemployment rate, particularly for low-skilled
workers. . . . There is widespread understanding that many low-income fathers who want
to pay support are unable to simply because of the obstacles to full participation in the
labor market.”); Maldonado, supra note 108, at 1003 (“The law has failed to distinguish
between fathers who can pay child support but refuse (the true deadbeats), and those who
are unemployed or severely underemployed (those who are deadbroke).”).
156 Cancian et al., supra note 64, at 142.
157 Id. at 142-43.
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financial enforcement actions. Yet the bulk of enforcement actions
to collect over $100 billion in arrears is brought against this
cohort.158 More than two-thirds of child support debtors report
either no income or income of less than $10,000 per year.159 These
fathers are already struggling even before the child support
judgment, which is often set at unrealistic levels.
To the extent that the legal system’s emphasis on child
support enforcement and its lack of support for engaged fathers
results in or perpetuates father absence, the state further
suffers financially. When children are living in deeper poverty,
their reliance on all public benefits, including TANF, is longer
lasting and more burdensome on the state.160
The state’s comparative valuations of child support and
parental engagement, which are reflected in the structure of child
support law, the enforcement of child support and parenting-time
orders, and the operation of family courts, have significant
implications for fathers, mothers, children, and the state. While
some implications are neutral at best, the relentless focus of the
legal system on enforcement of financial obligations against low-
income fathers can hurt families while failing to meet state goals.
Given these implications, an economy that does not suggest that
low-income fathers will soon have the means to meet obligations,
and the trends in rising father absence,161 a reassessment of the
legal system’s valuation of paternal breadwinning and caretaking
is necessary to provide for the well-being of children, families, and
the state alike.
IV. RECALIBRATING THE VALUE OF THE BREADWINNER AND
NURTURER ROLES TO SUPPORT THE FAMILY
By locating the enduring legacies of a legal system and
social norm structure that unequally assign gender responsibilities
and expectations in the family, and by understanding the
158 As of 2008, $105 billion was owed in child support. Id. at 150.
159 MARGUERITE ROULET, FINANCIAL LITERACY AND LOW-INCOME
NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 20 (2009), http://cffpp.org/publications/Policy_finance.pdf
[http://perma.cc/X5P4-ZXPA] (noting that of the men who could not pay their child
support obligations, 48% had no reported income in the past year, and 36% made
$10,000 a year or less); SORENSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 19 (reporting that
“[n]early three quarters of the high debtors had either no reported income (44 percent)
or reported income of $10,000 a year or less (30 percent)”); Hatcher, supra note 64, at
1078 (citing to an OCSE report from 2006 noting that close to two-thirds of obligors
reported income of less than $10,000).
160 Cf. Hamer, supra note 150, at 117 (alluding to the connection between
welfare policy and father absence).
161 See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
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implications of this role valuation on low-income families and the
state, we can now consider ways of recalibrating the legal system
to better serve families. In refining aspects of the legal system
that perpetuate its unrelenting focus on a father’s financial
contributions and apathy toward his caretaking, the system could
allow all parents—particularly low-income parents who are the
most vulnerable to the ill effects of the current system—to better
meet children’s needs and to make their most valuable
contributions to their children’s well-being. These changes could
equalize the importance of both paternal roles and destabilize the
aspects of the system that force mothers into the full-time
caretaking role regardless of their preferences. This new
paradigm could be accomplished by changes in child support laws,
enforcement of child-related obligations and commitments, and
the operation of the domestic-relations system.
A. Amending Child Support Law
To enable the legal system to maximize the potential of
parents to holistically support their children, child support law
must be reconsidered in light of the realities of low-income and
unemployed fathers. Child support law’s current structure—
based on the assumption of payor parents who can meet their
obligations and who can be forced to do so with coercive threats
of enforcement—does not allow the vast majority of low-income
parents to meet their children’s needs and, as discussed earlier,
conveys to fathers that their sole parental contribution of value
involves money. A reconsidered approach to child support at
the lowest income levels would allow the court to use the child
support system to buttress the entire parent-child relationship
in a way that is realistic for struggling fathers, validates their
nonfinancial efforts, and continues to stress the importance of
paternal responsibility. Specifically, modifications to the
current law’s ban on in-kind payments, its setting of initial
obligations, and its enforcement mechanisms could have a
significant positive effect on low-income families.
1. Creating Exceptions to the In-Kind Prohibition
Loosening the absolute prohibition on in-kind support
payments could serve to reduce barriers to paternal involvement,
provide realistic support to custodial mothers, and inoculate
noncustodial fathers from the collateral consequences of
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staggering child support arrears.162 Guidelines that ease these
restrictions for a limited period of time while a father searches for
employment and documents his efforts could benefit families and
validate fathers’ involvement with their children.163 Noncash
support could include the types of in-kind services permitted
under the federal guidelines regulating child support in Native
American lands.164 Pursuant to those guidelines, such support
must directly satisfy the needs of the children and can include
“making repairs to automobiles or a home, the clearing or upkeep
of property, [or] providing a means for travel.”165 The success of
such a program at the federal level suggests that the states could
more broadly permit noncash support as a workable alternative
for low-income, unemployed, noncustodial parents.
Loosening the ban on informal and in-kind payments
would likely maximize support payments by low-income fathers.
Societal norms in low-income and minority communities encourage
fathers to support their children in informal ways. As explained
by two child support scholars, these “well-developed community
norms regarding paternal responsibility for out-of-wedlock
children . . . engender in-kind contributions of food, clothing, toys,
child care or other assistance in lieu of financial contributions.”166
This community support of in-kind payments, coupled with
government approval of such child support, could result in
increased incentives for fathers, which would benefit fathers,
mothers, children, and the state alike.
162 See generally PETER EDELMAN ET AL., RECONNECTING DISADVANTAGED YOUNG
MEN 130 (2006) (asserting that mounting arrears are particularly destructive to
postincarcerated men); Cammett, supra note 104, at 315 (discussing the crippling effects of
child support enforcement on fathers who have recently been released from incarceration).
163 There has been some support for a move toward in-kind child support
contributions. See SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 19-20 (noting that some
commentators have suggested that permitting in-kind contributions would show that
the state recognizes the reality of a noncustodial parent’s circumstances but allows him
to remain involved with his child); Maldonado, supra note 108, at 1017-18 (analyzing
the prohibition on in-kind contributions and urging the law to find a way to credit
fathers for such contributions).
164 See 45 C.F.R. § 309.05 (2012) (defining noncash payment as “support
provided to a family in the nature of goods and/or services, rather than in cash, but
which, nonetheless has a certain and specific dollar value”).
165 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T,
TRIBAL AND STATE JURISDICTION TO ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT 74
(2007), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/IM/2007/im-07-03.htm [http://perma.cc/
A98S-ZQGW] (citation omitted). Significantly, the 2011 census data revealed that the most
common types of noncash support received, after gifts for special events, were clothes, food,
groceries, medical expenses, and full or partial payment for childcare or camp. GRALL, supra
note 2, at 12.
166 SORENSEN& TURNER, supra note 118, at 11 (citation omitted).
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Fathers express an interest in being able to contribute
money when they can and to compensate with other contributions
when necessary.167 They resent the system’s refusal to credit in-
kind contributions.168 For example, one study of unmarried
fathers in six cities across the country revealed that the majority
of fathers “contributed to the support of their children informally.
Overall, their preference was to purchase goods and services for
their children.”169 Edin and Nelson’s study corroborated this
finding, noting that the “‘as needed’ approach to financial
provision, which seldom puts [the] cash in the hands of the child’s
mother but is directly responsive to particular needs of the child,
is the method . . . nearly all men prefer.”170 Making informal
payments allows fathers to contribute in a way that feels
“tangible and gratifying.”171 Indeed, in-kind payments are more
pervasive than formal child support payments according to one
survey, which concluded that less than half of all custodial
parents receive formal child support payments, whereas “nearly
60% receive in-kind support of some form.”172
Mothers also express interest in informal and in-kind
payments. Low-income mothers often conclude that they are more
likely to receive money from struggling low-income fathers
through informal payments.173 Further, mothers, with the
significant exception of those who share children with abusive
fathers, often seek to maximize the type of paternal engagement
that usually accompanies noncash support.174 And significantly,
mothers support the availability of in-kind and informal
167 SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 98, at 13 (“Not surprisingly,
noncustodial parents, especially low-income fathers, prefer informal child support
agreements between themselves and the child’s mother wherein they contribute cash
support when they can and provide noncash aid such as taking care of the children
from time to time and buying food, clothing, presents, etc. as often as they can.”).
168 See Kohn, supra note 1, at 541-42 (discussing research on fathers and
restrictions on in-kind support).
169 MARY ACHATZ & CRYSTAL A. MACALLUM, YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: REPORT
FROM THE FIELD 98 (1994).
170 EDIN&NELSON, supra note 4, at 111.
171 ACHATZ&MACALLUM, supra note 169, at 98.
172 Steven Garasky et al., Toward a Fuller Understanding of Nonresident Father
Involvement: An Examination of Child Support, In-Kind Support, and Visitation, 29
POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 363, 364 (2010); see also Maureen R. Waller & Robert
Plotnick, Effective Child Support Policy for Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Level
Research, 20 J. POL’YANALYSIS&MGMT. 89, 96 (2001) (“[M]any parents believe that formal
child support is appropriate only when private agreements cannot be established or
maintained or when fathers do not accept their responsibility voluntarily.”); TIMOTHY
GRALL, supra note 2, at 2 (2011 census data revealed that close to 60% of custodial parents
received noncash support from noncustodial parents).
173 See Garasky, supra note 172.
174 See Carlson & McLanahan, supra note 127, at 468 (citing studies
illustrating that over 90% of unmarried mothers want fathers to help raise the child).
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payments because they are able to bargain with noncustodial
fathers as necessary depending on their needs.175 Contrary to
logic, research suggests that when fathers are financially able to
meet their formal support obligations in the first place, in-kind
payments do not lower the payment of formal child support.176
Eliminating the prohibition on in-kind payments would
likely maximize family well-being in many homes by encouraging
parental contact and positive father involvement and even by
increasing formal support payments. The act of supporting a child
has been found to be more critical to child well-being than the
formal nature and amount of child support.177 In-kind support is
also likely to result in increased paternal engagement. A recent
study analyzing the relationship between formal child support
payments, in-kind support, and visitation found the strongest
correlation to be between in-kind payments and visitation.178 In
addition, the legal preference for wage withholding and
automated payments of child support179 results in financial
175 See Joel F. Handler, Women, Families, Work, and Poverty: A Cloudy Future, 6
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 375, 423 (1996) (noting that informal means of support allowed
mothers to bargain based on a child’s month-to-month needs and use the threat of the
formal system as a bargaining tool); see alsoMaldonado, supra note 108, at 1009-10 (noting
that low-income African-American mothers recognize informal and in-kind contributions as
an important form of support); cf. Hatcher, supra note 64, at 1046 (stating that both child
support and welfare caseworkers reported that mothers’ fear of losing informal support was
a main reason for their noncooperation with enforcing child support obligations). But see
EDIN & NELSON, supra note 4, at 117 (noting that fathers’ in-kind contributions may not
correlate to the needs of the child, leaving a mother without the resources for her child’s
actual well-being).
176 Garasky, supra note 172, at 366 (also noting that we cannot say with
certainty if higher in-kind contributions lower child support payments, though prior
data suggests that is not the case).
177 Maldonado, supra note 41, at 962 (“[A] number of researchers have suggested
that the payment of child support is important in and of itself, independent of amount.”); see
also Judith A. Seltzer et al.,Will Child Support Enforcement Increase Father-Child Contact
and Parental Conflict After Separation, in FATHERSUNDERFIRE: THEREVOLUTION INCHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 157, 180-81 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998) (“Both the
instrumental variables models in the cross-sectional analysis and the longitudinal analysis,
in which we take account of fathers’ income and many aspects of the quality of family
relationships prior to separation, suggest that requiring fathers to pay at least some child
support will increase their involvement with their children.”).
178 Garasky, supra note 172, at 389. While Professor Garasky acknowledged
earlier studies linking formal child support and visitation, he asserts that the link is
weaker than the link between informal child support and nonresident father contact.
Id. at 389-90; see also Lenna Nepomnyaschy, Child Support and Father-Child Contact:
Testing Reciprocal Pathways, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 93, 108 (2007) (concluding that there is
a minimal link between child support payments and father-child contact but a stronger
link between informal contact and support).
179 E.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 46-218 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.1301
(West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 518A.53 (2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 158.011 (West
1997) (jurisdictions providing for automatic enforceability through withholding unless
the court finds there is good cause not to require immediate withholding or the parties
agree to an alternative method of payment).
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transfers without contact between the payor and family, whereas
in-kind payments generally involve personal interactions and can
foster a deeper connection between father and child.180
As promising as an in-kind payment regime seems to be
for the very low-income father, the risks of permitting these
payments must also be considered. Most significantly, informal or
in-kind contributions might be unreliable and the obligation
unenforceable. A less formal system might also result in a mother
becoming vulnerable to manipulation and coercion by the
noncustodial parent, particularly in abusive relationships. The
contributions a noncustodial father makes may not correlate to
the needs of the child, leaving a mother without useful support.
As Edin and Nelson concluded, some low-income fathers provide
items to please and impress the community or the child but not to
fulfill the child’s actual needs.181
There are also risks for noncustodial parents. The
informality of the agreement creates the potential for enforcement
actions that are difficult to defend against given the sometimes
amorphous nature of the obligation. As one D.C. father noted, he
prefers making formal child support payments because the
“mother could report not receiving support, [whereas] the court
would/should have a record.”182 Further, the family as a whole
might be hurt by this arrangement, as it could instigate increased
parental conflict.183
Finally, from the state’s perspective, the government
would lose the opportunity to track payments and enforce
obligations. Tracking, which requires payors to make payments
through a central registry, allows the government to monitor
whether noncustodial parents are fulfilling their obligations to
their children who might otherwise depend on government
benefits.184 The government would also lose the opportunity to
recoup TANF payments for mothers who assigned their child
180 See Garasky, supra note 172, at 367 (“Compared to current automated
methods for paying child support (e.g., wage withholding), the provision of in-kind
support more likely depends upon the father seeing the child.”). But see TERRYARENDELL,
supra note 99, at 89 (“When child support is withheld automatically from wages, higher
amounts are paid . . . .”); Chien-Chung Huang, Mothers’ Reports of Nonresident Fathers’
Involvement with Their Children: Revisiting the Relationship Between Child Support
Payment and Visitation, 58 FAM. REL. 54, 54-64 (2009) (asserting that automation of child
support enhances collection, thereby benefiting mothers).
181 EDIN&NELSON, supra note 4, at 117.
182 Author survey, supra note 72.
183 See Kohn, supra note 1, at 521-22 (discussing the effects of parental
conflict on father presence).
184 If assignment provisions were eliminated, however, the government also
would have less interest in the collection of monies.
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support payments to the state, which is a requirement of TANF
receipt.185 Moreover, this system would require the court to set
and determine an “exchange rate” between nonmonetary
contributions and cash—a challenging prospect for any judge.
Relaxing the rules might also express a tolerance for
reduced parental responsibility. Any time the state excuses
paternal nonpayment, it risks sending the message that
fathers—in this case poor fathers—are absolved of their full
responsibilities. In fact, this concern animated the Senate’s
debate of the Bradley Amendment,186 which prohibits state
courts from retroactively reducing child support obligations.187
A system permitting in-kind and informal payments need
not fail for these reasons, however. First, such a program could be
available only on a short-term basis to assist parents who are
between jobs but are actively engaged in employment searches
and job training.188 Legislation permitting in-kind contributions
could require courts to ratify that the agreement was in the best
interest of the child and to assess whether the custodial parent’s
agreement to participate was voluntary, thereby safeguarding, at
least in part, against manipulation by abusive partners in violent
or coercive intimate relationships.189 Parties opting in would need
to be fully informed that enforcement would be challenging given
the informality of the arrangement and that consent to these
payments could be withdrawn at any time by returning to court.
Parents—both custodial and noncustodial—could be strongly
advised to keep formal records of payments. The court could also
require that the obligor submit proof of “payment” in the form of a
sworn statement or receipt. A custodial parent could also specify
the types of in-kind contributions that would satisfy the
obligation, guarding against misaligned contributions. The federal
guidelines regulating child support in the Native American tribal
185 See generally Kohn, supra note 1, at 534-38 (discussing assignment of
child support).
186 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(c) (2006).
187 S. REP. NO. 99-348, at 155 (1986) (noting that “[w]hat the Committee is
seeking to prevent is the purposeful noncompliance by the noncustodial parent,
because of his hope that his child support obligation will be retroactively forgiven”).
188 See Maldonado, supra note 108, at 1018 (discussing her proposal of
implementing a temporary program to allow in-kind contributions and requiring
participants to show active employment search efforts). Professor Maldonado’s proposal
would also require that participant fathers spend a “minimum number of hours” per week
with their children. Id. Because of the challenges of ensuring the quality of parental
interaction when that interaction is coerced, this article would not require such a minimum
and would instead leave it to the court to fashion an appropriate in-kind exchange.
189 In making this proposal, this article also acknowledges the limits on
judicial inquiries into the presence of intimate-partner violence and coercion.
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system have responded to the challenge of monetizing in-kind
payments by requiring each support order to state the specific
dollar amount satisfied by the noncash payment.190
Moreover, while relaxing the ban would temporarily
excuse fathers from their formal financial responsibilities, if
carefully implemented, such a rule need not express acceptance of
reduced responsibilities, because the in-kind payment schedule
would have strict parameters. Such an exception to the ban would
be available only in cases of extreme indigence and for a
temporary period and pending a job search. Further, the law
would require performance and proof of in-kind contributions and
that those contributions were linked to taking responsibility for a
child and being part of a parenting unit.
Despite the evident risks, such a regime is worth
consideration, particularly for families with an unemployed
noncustodial parent. The current alternative is untenable. In the
present system, fathers are faced with mounting arrears and
their collateral consequences,191 and children are left without
financial or other support from their fathers. This alternative
child support regime could not only open avenues to greater
monetary and informal support, but it could also send the
message that financial obligations and parental engagement are
equally important, thus encouraging and validating positive
father involvement from a cohort of fathers whose current
interactions with the legal system seem to alienate them rather
than encourage them to be involved with their children. A child
support system that permits more flexible ways of supporting
children reflects a commitment to supporting families by allowing
both parents to maximize their potential to serve the best
interests of their children in both financial and nonfinancial ways.
2. Setting Child Support Obligations
Destabilizing family law’s focus on paternal financial
support requires reconsidering the support calculation. Any
recalibration of initial child support obligations must take into
account children’s and mother’s needs, as well as noncustodial
190 CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RL41204, CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: TRIBAL PROGRAMS 12 (2012). Monetizing caretaking work
could also provide a collateral benefit to mothers who perform the bulk of caretaking
and for whom caretaking has been deemed of visible value. See generally Maldonado,
supra note 108, at 1019-20 (noting that women, as traditional caregivers, would benefit
from the general notion of monetizing care work).
191 See generally Cammett, supra note 104, at 313-15 (discussing the collateral
consequences of child support enforcement, particularly on incarcerated parents).
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parent resources. At the lowest end of the income spectrum,
state statutes specify a minimum monthly obligation.192 Though
the child support obligation for an unemployed father might be
as low as $50 per month,193 such an obligation could still be
impossible for some fathers to meet.194 Research suggests that
the majority of low-income fathers fail to meet their obligations
not for lack of willingness to support their children, but
because they do not earn enough to satisfy their obligations.195
Child support obligations that set up low-income fathers for
failure cannot meet the needs of the children or the state. They
also have significant potential negative ramifications—in the
form of enforcement costs for the state and in the alienation of
fathers from their families. Just as child support guidelines do
not generally impose a presumptive obligation at the highest
end of the spectrum,196 at the lowest end, judges should use
their discretion to develop an obligation that considers the
obligor’s actual employment prospects and the potential for
him to meet his parental responsibilities in a different way.
Further, courts should be empowered to alter or suspend child
support obligations in a timely way during periods of
unemployment, incarceration, or incapacity.197
192 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115 (West 2014) (setting the minimum
payment for an obligor with a monthly adjusted gross income of less than $1,100 at $50 for
one child and $70 for two children); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (West 2014) (setting the
minimum child support payment for a low-income noncustodial parent at $100 per month
for one child); N.J. R. PRAC., App. IX-F (2013), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/csguide/
app9f.pdf [perma.cc/U6RN-WV5Y] (stipulating a minimum of $5 per week paid in child
support when parents’ combined net income is less than $180).
193 See, e.g., D.C. CODE. § 16-916.01(c)(3) (2001).
194 See Lee, supra note 75, at 25 (noting that noncustodial parents with a $50
support obligation “appropriately ask . . . [h]ow am I supposed to pay $50 per month
without a job?”).
195 JACINTA BRONTE-TINKEW ET AL., ELEMENTS OF PROMISING PRACTICE IN
TEEN FATHERHOOD PROGRAMS: EVIDENCE-BASED AND EVIDENCE-INFORMED RESEARCH
FINDINGS ONWHATWORKS 3 (2008); Murphy, supra note 40, at 354.
196 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115 (West 2014) (giving judges
“discretion to determine child support in circumstances where combined adjusted gross
income exceeds the uppermost levels of the schedule for basic child support
obligations”; the uppermost level is $30,000 in Colorado); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.126(a), (b) (West 2007) (allowing the court discretion to determine additional
child support if the obligor’s net resources exceed $7,500). Some states provide a cap on
certain aspects of child support. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518A.35 (West 2007)
(stating that for parents with a combined income greater than the income limit in this
statute ($15,000), the basic support obligation must be the same as it would be if their
income was equal to that limit ($15,000)).
197 See generally SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 19 (discussing some
commentators’ proposals that involve making child support statutes more sensitive to
changes in noncustodial parent employment). One problem for noncustodial parents with
shifting employment is the heavy docket in family courts. A motion to modify a child support
order may not be docketed and heard until after significant arrears have accrued.
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In addition, to further address the collateral consequences
of imposing untenable child support obligations, the legal system
must reconsider imputation of income. Judges can impute income
to unemployed or underemployed child support obligors198 based
on the assumption that obligors should be able to find
employment commensurate with their earning potential.
Imputation of income can offer a partial explanation for the
irrationally high child support obligations that low-income
noncustodial fathers may be obligated to meet. If the obligor
parent is present at the hearing, the judge may base the imputed
income on his testimony. If the obligor is not present, the judge
bases that calculation on the custodial parent’s testimony or on no
testimony at all.199 The calculation is often unrealistic because it
ordinarily assumes a 40-hour work week and minimum-wage
compensation, which can be an inaccurate assumption for some
populations.200 Further, it presupposes that everyone who invests
effort is able to obtain full-time employment regardless of the
economy and the particularities of the job seeker.201 In short, it
presumes all unemployment or underemployment of able-bodied
child support obligors is voluntary.
In reality, while some fathers remain voluntarily
unemployed and underemployed, data suggest that job prospects
for men with limited education and work history are dim given
current economic realities. Of the population of roughly three
million noncustodial fathers who have trouble meeting their
child support obligations, many have reported limited education
and work histories.202 Eighty percent of these fathers have
remained in school only long enough to attain at most a high
school degree, and some have criminal records that create a
further barrier to employment.203
Widespread imputation of income to low-income
noncustodial parents is unlikely to result in fuller employment and
198 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
199 See Patterson, supra note 74, at 108-09 (labeling the calculation of imputed
income as a “stab in the dark”).
200 Id.
201 The erroneous nature of this presumption is evident in the Iowa case of In re
Marriage of Fogle, 497 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). The court of appeals modified the
trial court’s child support order and instead imposed a child support obligation on an
unemployed father by imputing income to him based on a 40-hour work week at minimum
wage. See id. at 489. The court did so without any factual inquiry into his ability to work but
with the knowledge that the trial court characterized the father as an “ignorant, dull-witted,
lazy, inarticulate, unmotivated, thick-headed, moron of a man.” Id. at 488.
202 ELAINE SORENSEN & KYE LIPPOLD, URBAN INST., STRENGTHENING FAMILIES
THROUGHSTRONGERFATHERS INITIATIVE: SUMMARYOF IMPACTFINDINGS 5 (2012).
203 Id.
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higher levels of compliance with child support orders. Instead,
these parents are more likely to fall behind on payments, accrue
staggering arrears, and grow to resent the system and their
children. Imputation of income should be utilized in limited
circumstances that depend on proof of willful under- or
unemployment. When imputing income, a court should consider
the local unemployment rate and a parent’s individual job
qualifications. If a court cannot determine based on credible
evidence that a noncustodial parent is willfully unemployed,204 then
it should use constructive approaches to support the parent in his
attempts to reach full employment and refrain from imputation.
Ultimately, any forgiveness of initial child support
obligations could be perceived as a diminution in expectations for
low-income fathers. A minimum presumptive statutory obligation
and a hard line on arrears express the legal system’s expectation
that even unemployed parents will take responsibility for their
children and mothers should not have to go it alone. The proposal
discussed above, however, should not be implemented in a way
that absolves fathers of all responsibility. This new system of
setting initial child support obligations would rely on a broader
conception of parental responsibility, including nonmonetary
contributions. Any father who cannot meet a minimum obligation
would be required to perform other actions in support of his
children, and he would be required to do so until he is able to meet
a minimum obligation or satisfy reasonable arrears payments.
Reconsidering the obligation for a low-income father does not
involve eliminating the responsibility—it merely involves imposing
it in a way that is realistic and supportive to the child and custodial
parent and that fosters paternal engagement with the child, which
studies have found to be enormously beneficial to the entire family.
3. Enforcing Child Support Orders
Finally, the child support system’s enforcement
methodology must be reconsidered. As discussed above, the current
enforcement system fails to meet its goal of securing payments
and supporting mothers and children, costs the state significant
money, and perpetuates father absence. The key issue in
enforcing obligations against low-income fathers is the ability to
204 See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(D) (West 2014) (setting forth criteria by
which to determine willful or voluntary unemployment or underemployment).
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pay, as held in Turner.205 The current system is rational only
when nonpayment is volitional. When a court determines that a
father cannot pay, the judge must consider other approaches.
Courts should be empowered to forgive debts, fashion the
repayment of arrears through in-kind contributions, and order
obligors into supportive programs designed to enhance a father’s
potential to contribute in a range of ways. For example,
mandatory job training or placement programs could replace
incarceration and enhance a father’s potential to make monetary
contributions.206 Or a court could order in-kind support to
compensate the custodial parent if she agrees to such payments.
A recalibrated child support system should also involve
repealing the Bradley Amendment, under which judges cannot
forgive or reduce child support debt. A system that is committed
to getting the most it can from noncustodial parents and
supporting children and families must afford judges the discretion
to forgive child support debts. Judges working with families are
currently hamstrung when dealing with chronically low-income
fathers who have accrued arrears. Instead, they must maintain
the obligation and enforce it based on the government’s or
custodial parent’s wishes, even in the face of compelling evidence to
explain the arrears.207 Judicial discretion in considering arrears is
key to a system dealing with indigent families in a poor economy.
In order to enhance a low-income family’s potential to
meet its children’s needs, the legal system cannot treat the
satisfaction of monetary obligations as the only way to be a
responsible parent. Demanding without nuance that fathers
play this breadwinner role creates a cycle of repeated failure
for fathers and futility for the court system and children.
205 See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (analyzing whether
a court can hold a child support obligor in criminal contempt if he does not have the
resources to purge the contempt).
206 See SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., supra note 76, at 21 (discussing job training as
an alternative to incarceration and citing a model program). The D.C. Fathering Court
also provides a useful example of how such a response to nonpayment might work. See
infra Section III.C.
207 See generally Cheryl Wetzstein, Child-Support-Law Amendment Comes to
Attention of Hill; Provision Revision Could End to Horror Stories, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1999 (reporting on fathers returning from extended prison sentences and periods of war
captivity to find staggering child support arrears that judges could not retroactively reduce
or forgive due to the Bradley Amendment); Lena Trondson, Inequity of the Bradley
Amendment, TRONDSON ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.trondson.com/2009/01/
persecuting-low-income-and-disabled-parents [http://perma.cc/G6VL-M8X4] (arguing that
the Bradley Amendment unfairly labels low-income and disabled parents as deadbeat
parents when they are unable to meet their child support obligations).
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B. Enforcing Parenting-Time Orders
To enhance the family well-being and to express the
state’s interest in fathers taking on a more involved parental role,
the legal system must reconsider the consequences for parents who
fail to take advantage of their parenting time. Judicial approaches
that include incentives and self-activating contingency provisions
in custody orders could achieve these dual goals without imposing
overly coercive or punitive remedies.
Despite legal precedent holding that visitation rights
cannot be enforced against a recalcitrant father through forced
visitation, some scholars have advocated for courts to take a
more active role, but have left the parameters of that role
vague.208 Others have argued that courts should and do have
the authority to order the performance of particular caretaking
tasks,209 to protect child welfare,210 and to ensure that parenting
time is construed as a responsibility, not just a right.211
But strict enforcement of parenting-time and custody
orders against noncustodial parents who fail to take advantage of
the time the court has awarded them is neither likely to receive
court support nor well calibrated to achieve engaged paternal
relationships.212 Judges considering strict enforcement of visitation
provisions have refused to order fathers to visit against their
208 See Pollack & Mason, supra note 142, at 79 (“When it is determined that
continued contact with both parents is in the best interest of the child, the courts and
the state legislatures need to take a more active role in enforcement.”).
209 See Maldonado, supra note 41, at 995 (suggesting that judges are
authorized to order compliance with visitation provisions in the same way judges can
order the payment of child support).
210 See Czapanskiy, supra note 91, at 1436-42 (arguing that by analogy to the
abuse and neglect system, when a child’s well-being is at issue, the court has the
authority to order caregiving); see alsoMaldonado, supra note 40, at 995 n.366 (arguing
that courts have the authority to enforce missed parenting time under a theory of
parens patriae in order to protect children).
211 See Czapanskiy, supra note 91, at 1468; Maldonado, supra note 41, at 995.
Stating that courts normally take an active role in enforcing caretaking, Professor
Maldonado also argues that both mothers and fathers should be held responsible for
ensuring children visit with their nonresidential parent. SeeMaldonado, supra note 40, at
991-92 (suggesting such solutions as mothers being required to post bond until they
produce children for court-ordered visitation). Professor Maldonado also advocates for
additional sanctions to encourage visitation, suggesting that public penalties seeking to
shame absent parents could be effective. Id. at 996. Advocating for orders to engage in
community service, booting cars, and posting names of absent fathers online, Professor
Maldonado argues that stricter enforcement will lead to social norms of engaged
fatherhood that will stimulate community support and self-sanctioning. Id. at 998-1000.
212 See Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot,
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 196 (1983) (“A court order literally requiring an unwilling
noncustodial parent to visit, on pain of contempt, is absurd and counterproductive.”).
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will213 and have held that coercive visitation could be detrimental
to children.214 Coercing fathers to parent their children is unlikely
to create the kind of positive relationships that result in desirable
outcomes for children. A focus on hours logged rather than time
spent engaged with a child would result merely in compliance
with a court order and not in healthy parenting.
Courts are not powerless to encourage parenting time
through judicial action when fathers fail to take advantage of their
parenting-time rights, even if enforcement through contempt might
be legally untenable and counterproductive. By providing self-
activating remedies and ready access to status hearings and
modifications, judges can exert some influence in making parenting
time more probable in situations when it has been problematic.
First, judges can draft custody orders that include self-
activating consequences for violations of parenting-time
provisions.215 For example, when a noncustodial parent misses a
visitation, an order could require him to make in-kind payments
of food, clothing, or labor, such as house repairs and laundry.216
Drafted carefully, these consequences would be imposed without
further court action and might act as deterrents to missed
visitations. Of course, if fathers failed to comply with the
consequences, court action would be required to enforce the
provision, but a court would be far more likely to enforce an in-
kind obligation than to order visitation to occur.217
213 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text; Messer v. Messer, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (finding visitation to be a right).
214 Louden v. Olpin, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]he court
cannot order him to act as a father.”); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (noting the potential harm to children when they realize their fathers are
visiting them only due to the threat of contempt); McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk
Cty., 542 N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Iowa 1996) (“We are inclined to believe that visitation
motivated solely by the threat of contempt could not truly be said to satisfy a child’s best
interest.”); Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding that compelling a visit
under the threat of an increased child support obligation fails to promote a positive
parenting environment).
215 These provisions could be written to impose consequences on both custodial
and noncustodial parents for visitation violations. Such even-handed provisions would
be better received by the parties in a contested case and are more likely to be adopted
by parties in a settlement agreement.
216 Another commentator has endorsed further consequences, such as
terminating visitation or imposing liquidated damages for pain and suffering of the
parent or child. See Novinson, supra note 212, at 198-99. Terminating visitation would
frustrate the end goal of alleviating father absence. Liquated damages might be a
powerful disincentive for fathers who have substantial income, but for low-income
fathers, such a consequence would be unrealistic.
217 An alternative approach to responding to lapsed parenting-time rights—
admittedly one that relies on antiquated analogies of children to property—could involve a
property law analogy to adverse possession. A custody order could stipulate, for example,
that if a parent fails to use his or her parenting time, the primary parent would gain more
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Second, a custody order could include a provision giving a
parent seeking to enforce the visitation provision the right to a
status hearing upon filing a request. This clause would relieve the
party from filing a motion for modification or contempt and would
ease the court’s administrative burden of handling the motion
practice involved. Instead, a party could merely file a request for a
status hearing. At the hearing, the court could explore the
barriers to successful visitation, problem solve with both parties
present, and modify either sua sponte or at the request and
agreement of the parties. Such a hearing might reveal problems
with the order as written. For example, ambiguous terms might
be frustrating the efforts of the parties to cooperate or comply.218
Alternatively, the judge could assist the parties in solving
practical problems impeding visitation. If the status hearing
reveals that the father merely does not want to visit, such a
revelation would allow the mother and children to adjust their
expectations for the future. In some instances, problem solving
will require modifications, which, if implemented by the court at a
status hearing by consent of the parties, could make the process
far more efficient and effective.
In taking failure to visit seriously, the legal system could
validate engagement as an important paternal contribution and
offer a reluctant father the incentive he may need to take
advantage of his visitation rights. By crafting rational and
constitutionally sound ways to address failure to visit, the legal
system would convey the important message that paternal
engagement and child support contributions are mutually
reinforcing and equally critical ways of fulfilling parenting
responsibilities. The dialectic relationship between law and social
norms suggests that a reconsidered legal approach to the
noncustodial parent’s role as caregiver could have a significant
effect on behavior.219 Although judicial decisionmaking and law
rights to parent the child. This gradual shifting of rights based on use parallels adverse
possession in property law, whereby a squatter gains rights over land through occupation
and use of the property. See Eric M. Larsson, Acquisition of Title to Property By Adverse
Possession, in 142 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 349 (2015). In the family law context, the
“property” would be the children, and the “occupation and use” would be having regular
visitation. Allowing child visitation to be adversely possessed would not only give mothers
more meaningful recourse when visits are missed, but would also provide another incentive
for fathers to take advantage of visitation—a simple “use it or lose it” policy.
218 See, e.g., Messer v. Messer, 66 Cal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1968) (urging courts to
draft visitation provisions clearly and noting “where a decree is indefinite, it may make
a hesitant parent reluctant to exercise his rights of visitation”).
219 See generally Patrick S. O’Donnell, Social Norms & Law: An Introduction, 9
THEORY & SCI. 1, 6 (2007) (describing the interrelationship of laws as being multifaceted
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making may not bring about rapid change,220 together they can
support eventual shifts in social norms surrounding the family.221
C. Implementing a Problem-Solving Court System to
Consider Children’s Needs and Parental Contributions
Currently, many court systems bifurcate child support
and custody, considering them as separate legal matters and
scheduling them before different judges.222 To maximize the
potential for parents to support their children and to validate
the dual roles of parents, courts should consider the matters as
the inextricably tied issues that they are.223 Together, support
payments and custody comprise the formal structure of childcare
responsibilities, and in considering them in a holistic way, a court
can fully consider the needs of the children and the potential of
each parent to meet those needs.
Addressing support and child custody holistically could
entail merely consolidating the cases or treating them as
companion cases to be scheduled in tandem.224 Or a court system
could enhance its treatment of family cases by creating problem-
and discussing laws relating to the creation, maintenance, elimination, and even
sublimation of social norms).
220 See generally Dowd, Law, Culture and Family, supra note 20, at 787
(describing the “limited instrumentalism principle,” which explains that in the absence
of cultural support, law has only a limited ability to accomplish social change).
221 See id. at 791 (noting that law can facilitate social norm change).
222 Child custody and child support are seen as separate legal matters because of
the unconnected legislation behind both. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2012) (giving guidelines
to states for child support without mention of child custody); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 388-14 (2012) (giving administrative law judges power to enter support obligations, but
explicitly barring their authority to determine child custody or visitation issues). Judges are
admonished not to allow child support disputes to inform custody disputes, and vice versa.
See CHILDCUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 15:11 (2015) (explaining that courts refuse to allow, “a
parent [to] use visitation as a tool to secure support . . . on the theory that the provision for
support and the one for visitation are independent”); see, e.g., Sampson v. Johnson, 846 A.2d
278, 287 (D.C. 2004) (noting that “[p]ublic policy requires the treatment of support of
children and visitation rights as distinct problems” (quoting Stancill v. Stancill, 408 A.2d
1030, 1034 (Md. 1979))). Some courts do allow judges to consider the issues in tandem under
certain circumstances. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.16 (2001) (providing that the court can
make determinations about both custody and child support at the time of divorce or
annulment); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.431 (2014) (allowing the court to modify child support
payment when visitation is denied).
223 This article does not advocate for linking visitation to child support in the more
common scenario: withholding visitation from a nonpaying parent until he comes into
compliance. Not only does such an action discourage visitation, but it inappropriately makes
reciprocal the right of visitation and the obligation of child support. See generally Dowd,
supra note 90, at 141 (“Linking social rights to economic responsibilities reinforces the
notion of children as property, a classic hallmark of rejected patriarchal norms.”).
224 Some courts may resist consolidating child support and custody, because
doing so would require the custodial parent to appear for each hearing on a child
support matter unless the court expressly waived her presence.
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solving courts to address custody and support conflicts. Problem-
solving courts are traditionally instituted to create and apply
collaborative and holistic responses to chronic problems that have
proven resistant to conventional legal solutions,225 but these
courts have only been established in a limited way in the family
law context.226 Problem-solving courts are distinguishable from
traditional courts in that they involve cross-disciplinary
collaboration and judges taking a proactive role in solving
underlying problems in order to resolve legal conflicts.227
By design, problem-solving courts proactively address
barriers and engage litigants and concerned parties in
brainstorming successful solutions that would enhance custody and
support cases. Structural barriers to parenting time and custody
could be addressed with a problem-solving approach. Custodial
parents could express their own preferences for the assignment of
support responsibilities. Courts could more thoughtfully consider
the ways that noncustodial fathers might participate in the lives of
their children and support them even during periods when
financial support may be impossible. Partnerships with resource
providers could provide fathers with the support they need to both
meet their child support obligations and to simultaneously engage
positively and consistently with their children.
For low-income fathers, a narrow focus on enforcing child
support payments without considering alternatives fails to serve
225 See John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug
Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 282 (2000) (describing the collaborative approach
utilized by judges, lawyers, and service providers in New York’s problem-solving drug
courts); Problem-Solving Justice, CTR. FORCT. INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/
research/problem-solving-principles?url=research%2F11%2Farticle&mode=11&type=article
[http://perma.cc/J48E-4TYD] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (examining various shared
principles of problem-solving courts, including collaborative responses by members of the
legal community).
226 Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1280 (2008)
(“Although some alternatives are developing, . . . the adversarial system remains at the
center of family law, overshadowing other procedures.”). Even though there are
thousands of problem-solving courts in the United States, only a small number of them
are exclusively family law courts. See How Many Problem-Solving Courts Are There?,
NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-problem-
solving-courts-are-there [http://perma.cc/XFP8-ZDAM] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (listing
the number of problem-solving courts by type, excluding drug courts, and revealing that
there are only 63 child support, problem-solving courts in the United States and its
territories as of June 30, 2014). Most problem-solving courts are drug courts. See About
NADCP, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/learn/about-nadcp
[http://perma.cc/CH5Y-AZMF] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (showing NADCP has 2,734
drug courts and 1,122 other problem-solving courts).
227 See generally Donald J. Farole, Jr., et al., Applying Problem-Solving
Principles in Mainstream Courts: Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57 (2005)
(providing an overview of the principles behind problem-solving courts); Lee, supra
note 75, at 25 (discussing the philosophy of problem-solving courts).
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the goals of child welfare or government reimbursement.228 A
problem-solving court allows a judge to consider how to assist
obligors in meeting their obligations in lieu of routine fines and
contempt convictions.229 Positioning a father for compliance with
his order230 better situates him for meeting his obligations and
being involved with his children, which will result in more
positive outcomes for fathers, mothers, and children.231
Model programs suggest that problem-solving courts
would succeed in enhancing family potential and expressing the
legal system’s interest in supporting fathers’ dual roles as
breadwinners and engaged parents. One example, the D.C.
Superior Court’s Fathering Court Initiative, features a problem-
solving approach that is not solely focused on how to maximize
child support payments—as a court handling child support
matters generally would. Instead, the program incorporates
services to enhance the noncustodial parent’s ability to contribute
financially to his child while balancing that obligation with “the
many other issues necessary to promote co-parenting.”232 The
228 See Brito, supra note 74, at 619 (“Inflexible application of child support
collection and enforcement measures designed to ensure that child support payments
are ‘automatic and inescapable,’ no matter the circumstances, lead to this devastating
phenomenon when applied to the chronically poor.” (citing Paul K. Legler, The Impact
of Welfare Reform on the Child Support Enforcement System, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE
NEXT FRONTIER, 46, 49-50 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli, eds. 2000))).
229 Although several commentators have called for such reform, few jurisdictions
have implemented problem-solving approaches to child support enforcement. See Brito,
supra note 74, at 665 (“[C]hild support enforcement efforts must be coupled with measures
designed to improve the employment prospects and overall financial security of poor
fathers.”); Cancian et al., supra note 64, at 153-58 (proposing a system designed to maximize
child welfare, reduce public expenditures, and assist fathers in meeting their obligations,
and noting that some states consider child support obligations in tandem with food stamps
and health care).
230 Consolidating child support and custody into one matter can facilitate a court’s
thoughtful implementation of statutes and court rules that balances child support
obligations with parenting time and custody. Increasingly common, such statutes permit the
court to modify child support obligations based on the time the child actually spends with
each parent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT § 518A.36.2 (2014) (specifying the procedures for reducing
support obligations based on additional parenting time by the payor parent); NEB. CT. R. 4-
210 (2008); UTAHCODEANN. § 78B-12-216 (1) (West 2008) (specifying that the child support
calculation is based on the actual time a child spends with each parent). For example, in
Nebraska, court rules empower a court to adjust a child support obligation by as much as
80% when a parent who does not have primary custody takes advantage, by agreement of
the parties or court order, of parenting or visitation time not originally contemplated in a
custody order. NEB. CT. R. 4-210 (2008). Through such statutes and rules, the court can
allow families to recalibrate the balance of parenting time and support.
231 See Welfare Reauthorization, supra note 138, at 2 (“If children are to
benefit from the ongoing support and involvement of both parents, it is important to
develop strategies to improve the limited economic prospects of low-income fathers.”).
232 Lee, supra note 75, at 25. Though the program initially sought to focus on the
general population owing child support obligations, grant funding dictated that the
program offer services only to recently released offenders owing child support arrears. Id.
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collaborative program involves the court, several agencies, and
private sector partners233 that all play a role in supporting the
noncustodial father’s efforts to meet his child support obligations
and maintain a relationship with his children.234 The partners
provide support to fathers in job training and placement,
budgeting, and parenting skills and require that each participant
enroll in a curriculum focused on the role and importance of a
father in a child’s life.235
A Texas program involves a similar collaboration between
the courts, the Attorney General, and nonprofits, and refers to
itself as a “child support-driven employment project.”236 This
program focuses on helping noncustodial parents obtain
employment and overcome the challenges that prevent or limit
their career advancement.237 Along with counseling organizations,
the program endeavors to prepare noncustodial parents to
financially and emotionally support their children.238 Data show
success in both employment and child support compliance.239
Participants in the program were 21% more likely to be employed
than the control group parents.240 The program also reported that
participants paid their child support 47% more often and at a
higher rate than the control group. They also reported a 21% drop
in TANF reliance by the custodial parents—relative to a
comparison group not enrolled in the program—in their first year
in the program and a 29% drop in years two through four.241
Problem-solving courts do have their limitations that must
be considered and strategically addressed. Problem-solving courts
mandate extensive court involvement. Routine hearings, judicial
oversight, and mandatory referrals allow these courts to play the
constructive role expected of them. For low-income litigants who
233 These organizations include the government’s child support enforcement
agency, its probation office, the Department of Human Services, the Department of
Employment Services, and the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 27.
236 Noncustodial Parents Choices Project–Texas, OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/noncustodial-
parents-choices-project [http://perma.cc/LQ3V-Q29R].
237 Id.
238 Noncustodial Parent Choices—Program Overview, TEXAS WORKFORCE (June
24, 2014), http://www.texasworkforce.org/welref/noncustodial-parent-choices-program-
overview.html [http://perma.cc/9AEA-ZA8D].
239 Daniel Schroeder & Stephanie Chiarello, Texas Non-Custodial Parent Choices:
Program Impact Analysis, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF PUBL. AFFS. (Aug. 2008),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cs/ofi/ncp_choices_program_impact.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9PS4-YPUD].
240 Id.
241 Id. at 65-66.
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often experience extensive government intrusion related to public
benefits, however, such involvement may be unwanted242 and may
place an untenable burden on their work obligations. For this
reason, and because problem-solving courts require a longer-term
commitment and a certain level of cooperation from the litigants,
any problem-solving court handling custody and child support
should require express, informed opting in by the parties.243 To
address the extensive time commitment, the problem-solving
court could sit during weekends or in the evenings. Such
flexibility, inherent in the problem-solving model, could serve
both custodial and noncustodial parents—but would require
additional judicial resources.
Problem-solving courts have provoked criticism for
reducing adversarial justice’s procedural safeguards.244 As such,
they may disadvantage pro se litigants and those with less social
capital.245 Problem-solving courts have also been critiqued for
devaluing the legal issue and suggesting it is not worth formal
adjudication.246 While these are causes for concern, studies of
problem-solving courts have found that litigants generally express
satisfaction and are in compliance with the courts’ orders,
diminishing the realistic concerns about the possible negative
implications of reducing procedural justice.247
242 See Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78
U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 910-11 (2010) (discussing the troubling loss of privacy for poor
people in therapeutic courts).
243 But see Paul Holland, Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts,
34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 185, 204 n.68 (2010) (noting the complications of obtaining
true consent for problem-solving court procedures).
244 See, e.g., id. at 195-210 (analyzing the lack of procedural safeguards in
problem-solving courts); Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement:
Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 57, 63-64 (2009) (noting that that there has been too little consideration of
procedural rights and justice in problem-solving courts); BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE,
DEP’T OF JUST., CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS TO IMPLEMENTING PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS FROM THE TRADITIONAL COURT MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (2008),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/AU_ProbSolvCourts.pdf [http://perma.cc/674E-T5A6]
(describing the drawbacks of shifting from adversarial to problem-solving courts).
245 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1917-19 (1998) (detailing the lack of procedural safeguards in drug
courts, a type of problem-solving court where the traditional model seen in adversarial
systems is diminished, putting defendants at a significant disadvantage).
246 See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-
Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most
Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2067-68 (2002) (arguing that therapeutic courts
are anti-intellectual and wholly ineffective because they focus on state-sponsored
treatment and curing diseases rather than on adjudication, “and the adjudicative process
is often seen as an unnecessary and disruptive impediment to treatment”).
247 In the few states that have implemented problem-solving courts in a family law
context, experience suggests that problem-solving courts work very well in child support
cases. See Georgia Finds Successes in Its Problem Solving Courts, DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT
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Problem-solving courts can be expensive to establish and
maintain; however, when balanced against their potential cost
savings, the investment in such courts can be cost effective.248 The
Texas program reported that the average cost of the program is
only $1,000 for each noncustodial parent served.249 The D.C.
program requires limited expenditures since all partnering
programs preexisted the establishment of the court.250 Further,
the program saves the jurisdiction significant resources by
reducing or obviating the need for enforcement actions,
incarceration for failure to pay child support, and the
administration of the enforcement mechanism.251 Navigating the
resources previously directed towards enforcements actions and
incarceration of fathers for failure to pay to these problem-solving
courts will result in positive outcomes for both families and the
state without imposing an extreme financial burden on the state.
Problem-solving courts do not come without complications.
But if carefully designed and implemented, the concerns about
the burdens these courts impose on litigants and the court’s
finances, as well as the reduced levels of procedural justice, can be
overcome—or at least minimized. The benefits to this area of law
likely outweigh the drawbacks. Problem-solving courts could
simultaneously convey the importance of monetary support of
children and the significance of paternal caretaking. At the same
SERVS. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://dcss.dhs.georgia.gov/press-releases/2013-11-12/georgia-finds-
successes-it%E2%80%99s-problem-solving-courts [http://perma.cc/38B5-6GSW] (explaining
the success of a child support problem-solving court in Georgia in 2013; in one year, the
problem-solving “program helped 313 participants in 11 . . . courts . . . , resulting in 76
percent now paying their child support”); see also Aaron Arnold, The Parent Support
Program: The Problem-Solving Court Approach to Child Support Enforcement, 61 CHILD
SUPPORT Q. 25, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/Parent_
Support_Program_article.pdf [http://perma.cc/9364-KVRZ] (explaining problem-solving
courts’methods of child support enforcement and their success).
248 See, e.g., Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-
Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1484,
1486 (2004) (comparing problem-solving to traditional adjudication and highlighting
the cost benefits that treatment courts have because there is no cost of incarceration);
see also Sarah Felsen, Colorado’s Family-Integrated Problem-Solving Courts, 42 COLO.
L., 75, 76-77 (2013) (asserting that family-integrated problem-solving courts in
Colorado are more cost effective than the normal system, even with the addition of
program and treatment costs).
249 Schroeder & Chiarello, supra note 239.
250 Lee, supra note 75, at 26-28 (discussing the various partners in the
program and noting that the programs pre-dated this specialized court). Only the
private contract with a job-training organization and the overhead of family outings
are direct costs to the program.
251 Id.; see also Brito, supra note 74, at 667-68 (arguing that individualized
approaches to child support enforcement result in increased expenses, which are offset
by savings in enforcement proceedings and increased child support payments).
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time, they could further enhance opportunities for parents to
contribute most effectively to their children’s development.
CONCLUSION
The legal system’s assignment of high value to paternal
breadwinning fails low-income children and families generally.
Deadbroke fathers, unless they are given considerable support,
may not be able to fulfill this role for their children, and in failing
to do so, they become vulnerable to time-consuming and costly
enforcement actions, incarceration, and alienation from their
children. Fathers who are advised to not show up at all if they
don’t have cash in hand252 have few incentives to engage with
their children. The state has little to gain in continuing to
privilege paternal breadwinning responsibilities and much to lose
in wasting resources and perpetuating father absence. Nor do
mothers and children stand to reap substantial benefits from the
legal system’s myopic pursuit of child support from fathers who
are unable to pay. Instead, mothers lose the ability to bargain
privately with fathers and rarely see significant payments. For
mothers who want fathers involved, the state’s prioritization of
the father’s breadwinning role over the caretaking role can result
in paternal absence and the perpetuation of gender inequality.
By seeking to equalize the importance of paternal
financial support and caretaking, the legal system can help
nonintact families maximize the true support of their children. A
reconsidered approach could eliminate explicit and implicit legal
preferences for paternal financial support in lieu of caretaking
support, enforce responsibilities related to both roles in a
thoughtful and rational way, and handle family law cases
holistically, with the goal of maximizing the best interests of the
children and the potential contributions of each parent. After
such changes, our legal system could more efficiently protect
government coffers, positively influence social norms, and
maximize child welfare in low-income families. Such a
recalibration of values would actually create higher expectations
for the noncustodial parent, demanding more than his money
and validating his role as parent. Such a shift in norms and
expectations accomplished through these reforms could take
place without conveying to fathers that their financial
contributions are irrelevant or that their financial
responsibilities are excused. Instead, such shifts in the family
252 Greif et al., supra note 111, at 252.
110 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1
law system, if undertaken thoughtfully, could reflect the system’s
commitment to paternal involvement and responsibility. And it
could do so through a contextual approach that supports mothers
in performing their critical roles in both the family and the
economy and assists fathers in fulfilling their multifaceted
paternal obligations to their children.
